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INTRODUCTION
That is a novel method of amending rules of procedure. It subverts the plans and hopes of the profession for careful, informed study
leading to the adoption and to the amendment of simple rules which
shall be uniform throughout the country.
2
Judge Charles E. Clark, dissenting in Arnstein v. Porter

Judge Clark must be rolling over in his grave.
3
In 1990, Congress enacted the Judicial Improvements Act,
an omnibus bill that created ninety-four amateur rulemaking
groups throughout the entire federal judicial system. In Title I,
the Civil Justice Reform Act,4 Congress commanded these advisory groups to formulate civil justice expense and delay reduction plans by the end of 1993. 5 In addition, Congress ordered
the Judicial Conference to designate ten federal courts as pilot
districts, which were required to expedite their reform plans
and complete them by December 31, 1991.6 In the Judicial Im2. 154 F.2d 464, 479 (2d Cir. 1946) (Clark, J., dissenting). Judge Clark
was referring to the majority decision, which reversed an order granting defendant's motion for summary judgment in a copyright infringement case. Id.
at 475. Judge Clark was the Reporter of the Committee that drafted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, promulgated in 1938. He subsequently served as
the first Reporter to the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules. See generally Michael E. Smith, Judge CharlesE. Clark and the FederalRules of Civil
Procedure, 85 YALE L.J. 914 (1976) (describing Judge Clark's participation in
the drafting and promulgation of the Federal Rules).
3. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089
(1990) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); see also S. REP. No. 416,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6852; H.R.
REP. No. 732, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1990).
4. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 101-105, 104
Stat. 5089-98 (1990) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. II 1990)). The Judicial Improvements Act also created seventy-seven new federal district and circuit court judgeships. 28 U.S.C. § 133 (Supp. II 1990).
5. Civil Justice Reform Act § 103(b), 28 U.S.C. § 471 note (Supp. II 1990).
6. See id. at § 105(b)(1); see also Memorandum from The Hon. William B.
Schwarzer to All Chief Judges, U.S. District Courts (Jan. 16, 1991) (on file at
the Federal Judicial Center and the Minnesota Law Review). The Judicial
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provements Act, Congress served notice that it was going to
have civil justice reform and have it immediately.
The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 is fomenting a nationwide procedural revolution that is probably unparalleled since7
the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.
The Act mandates local, grassroots rulemaking by civilian advisory groups, a novel process that essentially circumvents the
usual judicial advisory committee system for civil procedure
rule reform that has been in place since 1938.8 In this respect
alone the Act is revolutionary.
It would be difficult to overstate the Act's importance. Superficially, the various local rule reforms that individual districts recommend will be of great interest and significance to
litigants, their lawyers, and the general public. The civil justice
reform plans published and implemented by the various dis9
tricts will generate a large body of commentary and debate.
Conference's Committee on Court Administration and Case Management has
primary oversight responsibility for implementation of the Act and a subcommittee developed criteria for selection of the ten pilot district courts. The full
committee met on January 3-4, 1991, and approved the subcommittee's recommendations for ten pilot districts. The statute required that at least five of the
ten designated pilot districts encompass metropolitan areas. See Civil Justice
Reform Act § 105(b)(2), 28 U.S.C. § 471 note (Supp. II 1990). The ten designated pilot districts are: the Southern District of California, the District of
Delaware, the Northern District of Georgia, the Southern District of New
York, the Western District of Oklahoma, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
the Western District of Tennessee, the Southern District of Texas, the District
of Utah, and the Eastern District of Wisconsin. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
U.S., CivL JUSTICE REFORM ACT REPORT: DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF PLANS BY EARLY IMPLEMENTATION DISTRICTS AND PILOT COURTS 1
(June 1, 1992) [hereinafter CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT REPORT].

7. See Linda S. Mullenix, Civil Justice Reform Comes to the Southern
District of Texas: Creating and Implementing a Cost and Reduction Plan
Under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 11 REV. LITIG. 165, 167 (1992).
Portions of the ensuing text are adapted from this article and reprinted by
permission.
8. For a description of the rulemaking process, see generally The RuleMaking Function and the JudicialConference of the United States, 21 F.R.D.
117 (1958); WINIFRED R. BROWN, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES 1-35 (1981); Howard Lesnick, The Federal Rule-Making Process, A
Time ForRe-examination, 61 A.B.A. J. 579 (1975); Judge Albert B. Maris, Federal Procedural Rulemaking: The Program of the Judicial Conference, 47
A.B.A. J. 772 (1961); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: MandatoryInformal Discovery and the Politicsof Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 797-802,
830-43 (1991); Russell R. Wheeler, Broadening Participationin the Courts
Through Rule-Making and Administration, 66 JUDICATURE 280 (1979).
9. There is already a significant amount of commentary on various plans.
See, e.g., FederalDistrict Court Names Advisory Group, MASS. L. WKLY., Feb.
4, 1991, at 3 (discussing creation of Massachusetts Advisory Group under Civil
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The true significance of the Civil Justice Reform Act, however, does not lie in the nuts and bolts of procedural reform. It
is not in whether local districts enact a mandatory disclosure
rule,10 institute early neutral evaluation programs,"' or require
2
recourse to alternative dispute resolution (ADR) techniques.'
Justice Reform Act); Mary Hull, "Jiffly Justice" May Become The Norm, TEX.
LAW., July 22, 1991, at 1 (discussing impact of the Civil Justice Reform Act on
Texas's four judicial districts); Adrienne C. Locke, Civil Justice Reform Bill
Expected to Cut Costs, Bus. INS., Nov. 5, 1990, at 2 (discussing Civil Justice Reform Act and creation of pilot districts); Carl Tobias, Justice Stays Civil in
Montana, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 25, 1991, at 20 (discussing Civil Justice Reform
Act report and plan in Montana); Daniel Wise, Eastern DistrictPanel Proposes
Measures to Speed Civil Cases, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 4, 1991, at 1 (discussing report
and plan for the Eastern District of New York).
10. See 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(2)(C) (Supp. II 1990). For examples of
mandatory disclosure rules see ADVISORY GROUP OF THE U.S. DIST. COURT FOR
THE N. DIST. OF CAL., REPORT AND PLAN (1991) (rule requiring exchange of
core information); U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE DIST. OF DEL., CIVIL JUSTICE ExPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (Dec. 23, 1991) (automatic disclosures in
personal injury, malpractice, RICO, and employee civil rights cases); CIVIL
JUSTICE ADVISORY GROUP OF THE U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE S. DIST. OF ILL.,
REPORT AND PLAN (1991) (automatic disclosures prior to discovery in all
cases); ADVISORY GROUP OF THE U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE E. DIST. OF N.Y.,
REPORT TO HON. THOMAS C. PLATT, CHIEF JUDGE (Oct. 22, 1991) (automatic
disclosure prior to discovery for all filings for 18 month test period; new rule
to correspond with proposed Federal Rule 26); SOUTHERN DIST. OF N.Y. CIVIL
JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY GROUP, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(Nov. 1, 1991) (mandatory discovery in pro se prisoner cases); ADVISORY
GROUP OF. THE U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE W. DIST. OF OKLA. APPOINTED
UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990, REPORT (Oct. 21, 1991)
(mandatory disclosure for all cases; new rule to correspond with proposed Federal Rule 26); U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE E. DIST. OF TEX., CIVIL JUSTICE ExPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN PURSUANT TO THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM

ACT OF 1990 (Dec. 20, 1991) (duty of disclosure under three delineated management tracks); and CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY GROUP OF THE U.S.
DIST. COURT FOR THE S. DIST. OF TEX., supra note 1, and CIVIL JUSTICE ACT
ADVISORY GROUP OF THE U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE S. DIST. OF TEX., COST
AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990
(Oct. 24, 1991) (voluntary disclosure modelled on proposed Federal Rule 26 on
trial basis in 10-20 cases per judge).
11. See 28 U.S.C. § 473(b)(4) (Supp. II 1990). For examples of such programs see ADVISORY GROUP OF THE U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE N. DIST. OF
CAL., supra note 10 (court-annexed early neutral evaluation program); ADvISORY GROUP OF THE U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE E. DIST. OF N.Y., supra note 10
(court-annexed early neutral evaluation; pro bono); and ADVISORY GROUP OF
THE U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE N. DIST. OF OHIO, REPORT AND PLAN (1991)
(court-annexed early neutral evaluation, mediation, non-binding arbitration).
12. See 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(6) (Supp. II 1990). For examples see ADVISORY
GROUP OF THE U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE N. DIST. OF CAL., supra note 10
(court-annexed non-binding arbitration); ADVISORY GROUP OF THE U.S. DIST.
COURT FOR THE N. DIST. OF GA., REPORT AND PLAN (1991) (court-annexed arbitration); ADVISORY GROUP OF THE U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE W. DIST. OF
MICH., REPORT AND PLAN (1991) (arbitration referrals); ADVISORY GROUP OF
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Commentators who analyze and debate the narrow merits of
specific local reform measures will miss the crucial importance
of the Act. To date, almost everyone who has considered the
Act has mistakenly focused on the nuts and bolts. 13
The central importance of the Civil Justice Reform Act is
this: the Act has effected a revolutionary redistribution of the
procedural rulemaking power from the federal judicial branch
to the legislative branch. Congress has taken procedural
rulemaking power away from judges and their expert advisors
and delegated it to local lawyers. By the expedient of declaring
procedural rules to be substantive law, Congress has effectively
repealed the Rules Enabling Act.14 Congress has by fiat
stripped the judicial branch of a power that uniquely bears on
the judicial function: the power to prescribe internal rules of
procedure for the federal courts. By legislative stealth in enacting the Civil Justice Reform Act, Congress is continuing to
on Civil Rules into a
transform the Advisory Committee
15
quaint, third-branch vestigial organ.
The implications of this unheralded revolution will be dramatic and widespread for years to come. At the most pragmatic
level, the grassroots local advisory groups are destined to create
problematic local rules, measures, and programs. Although this
"bottom up" approach to rulemaking is theoretically laudable,
it can also be viewed as a politically cynical way of magically
conferring a democratic patina on a rulemaking process that is
not truly locally inspired, but federally orchestrated by Washington. 16 Furthermore, local amateur rulemaking groups, howTHE U.S. DisT.COURT FOR THE E. DIST. OF N.Y., supra note 10 (court-annexed

arbitration and mediation); SOUTHERN DIST. OF N.Y. CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM
ACT ADVISORY GROUP, supra note 10 (mandatory court-annexed mediation for

all expedited cases and sample of other cases pro bono); ADVISORY GROUP OF
THE U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE N. DIST. OF Omno, supra note 11 (extensive

ADR program with ADR administrator to oversee program); and CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY GROUP FOR THE U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE W.

DIST. OF TENN., REPORT (Sept. 26, 1991) (local rule amended to authorize ADR
referrals).
13. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 9.
14. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
15. See Mullenix, supra note 8, at 801-02 (predicting demise of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules's influence on the rulemaking process for reasons unrelated to the Civil Justice Reform Act).
16. See 28 U.S.C. § 473 (Supp. II 1990). This section provides a detailed list
of recommended procedural innovations that the local advisory groups are instructed to consider in developing the content of their civil justice reform
plans. In addition, local advisory groups have received multiple memoranda
from the Federal Judicial Center with proposals for procedural rules. See, e.g.,
Memorandum from The Hon. William B. Schwarzer to All Chief Judges, U.S.
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ever intelligent, diligent, and well-intentioned, are ill-equipped
to *performthe basic tasks the Act requires, such as conducting
docket assessments1'7 and evaluating the reasons for cost and
delay in the district.18 Bad social science will form the basis for
bad rulemaking.
This vast experiment in local rulemaking will undermine
the procedural reform that promulgation of the federal rules
effected in 1938. Judge Clark aptly captured the aesthetic 19 of
that first procedural reformation in his Arnstein dissent: careful, informed study that leads to the adoption and amendment
of simple rules that are uniform throughout the country. The
reforms the Civil Justice Reform Act mandates are not conducive to careful, informed study of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Further, it is doubtful that the Act's requirements
will lead advisory groups to recommend simple rules. Instead,
with its statutory emphasis on increased judicial management
of litigation, the Act encourages (if not requires) a proliferation
of increasingly complex and specific local rules.
The Civil Justice Reform Act is at war with the concept of
uniform procedural rules throughout the federal district courts.
The Act instead directly contributes to an increased balkanization of federal civil procedure, a process that began with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83, which authorizes the creation
of local rules.20 What began as an aesthetic of procedural simplicity has been transformed, over fifty years, into a reigning
reality of procedural complexity. Today, federal practice and
procedure is impossibly arcane.
A federal practitioner must now know, in addition to the
Federal Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure, the existing local rules of ninety-four district courts and eleven federal cirDistrict Courts supra note 6; Memorandum from the Judicial Conference of
the United States to Chief Judges, United States District Courts (March 4,
1991) (on file with the Minnesota Law Review). The Advisory Group for the
Southern District of Texas also received copies of Vice President Quayle's A
REPORT FROM THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR
CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN AMERICA [Hereinafter AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE

REFORM] (Gov. Printing Office, Aug. 1991), during the course of their delibera-

tions. See infra notes 33-37 and accompanying text discussing Vice President
Quayle's Report.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 472(c)(1) (Supp. II 1990). The advisory groups have been
directed to assess the condition of both civil and criminal dockets.
18. Id. § 472(c)(1)(C), (D).
19. See generally Janice Toran, 'Tis A Gift To Be Simple: Aesthetics And
ProceduralReform, 89 MICH. L. REV. 352 (1990) (describing the underlying
philosophy of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as enacted in 1938).
20. See FED. R. CIV. P. 83.
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cults. 2 1

The practitioner simply cannot know the procedures of
any other federal district without looking them up, just as an
out-of-state practitioner must research the rules of a foreign jurisdiction. As a consequence of the Act, the practitioner's life
will now be further complicated by the overlay of new rules,
measures, and programs promulgated and implemented on the
recommendation of ninety-four local advisory groups.
Incredibly, in addition to all this procedural babel, 22 the
Federal Advisory Committee on Civil Rules remains in existence, currently drafting further revisions to the general federal
rules, 23 a task that parallels the work of the local advisory
groups. With regard to the proliferation of rulemakers, one is
reminded of the old Abbott and Costello joke "Who's on first?"
Whatever may be said for the democratic process, it should be
abundantly clear to any observer of the rulemaking scene that
there are now too many procedural cooks. What the relationship among all these rulemaking bodies and their resulting
rules will be poses an interesting academic question. For the
average lawyer and potential federal litigant, however, what
procedural rules govern in any given federal court is a pointed
real-life dilemma. Procedural rules govern court access, shape
21. See generally Stephen N. Subrin, FederalRules, Local Rules, and State
Rules: Uniformity, Divergence,and EmergingProceduralPatterns,137 U. PA.
L. REV. 1999 (1989) (discussing history and current state of local rules). As
Professor Subrin and his colleagues have demonstrated, local rules may or
may not be consistent with the general federal rules of civil procedure. Cf A.
Leo Levin, Local Rules As Experiments: A Study in the Division of Power,139
U. PA. L. REV. 1567 (1991) (approving of Rule 83's creation of "local laboratories" for new rules).
22. Professor Maurice Rosenberg, in congressional testimony, was apparently the first to use the Tower of Babel metaphor for local rules. See Levin,
supra note 21, at 1569 n.5 (citing HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, RULES EN.
ABLING ACT OF 1985, H.R. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 n.55 (1985)).
23. See COMIITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED
AiENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE (Aug. 1991); see also Thomas M. Mengler, Eliminating

Abusive Discovery Through Disclosure: Is It Again Time For Reform?, 138
F.R.D. 155 (1991) (questioning desirability of proposed discovery rule revisions); Ann Pelham, Judges Make Quite a Discovery; LitigatorsErupt, Kill
Plan to Reform Federal Civil Rules, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 16, 1992, at 1 (discussing withdrawal of proposed discovery rule modifications); Economic Studies
Program and the Center for Public Policy Education, Project Proposal, The
Future of Jury-Based Litigation in the United States (July 1991) (joint proposal of the Brookings Institution and the Litigation Section of the American
Bar Association to reform the jury trial system) (on file with the Minnesota
Law Review).
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the structure of lawsuits, and significantly influence the course
of pretrial proceedings.
Finally, the Act authorizes unconstitutional rulemaking, violates the separation of powers doctrine, and arrogates to Congress unprecedented authority over federal procedure. The
Civil Justice Reform Act should be understood as an alarming
intrusion by Congress-made without adequate legal or empirical foundation-into the judiciary's internal housekeeping affairs. This intrusion strips the judicial branch of its important
function of procedural rulemaking. Unless and until the Civil
Justice Reform Act is challenged as an unconstitutional delegation of rulemaking authority, federal courts will be subjected to
varying popular local whims relating to court access and
procedure.
My thesis is simple: The Civil Justice Reform Act revokes
the Rules Enabling Act and authorizes unconstitutional
rulemaking. The Act violates the separation of powers doctrine
and substantially impairs the ability of the federal courts to
control their internal processes and the conduct of civil litigation. Congress is simply wrong in declaring that it has exclusive federal rulemaking power. What Congress has taken from
the judiciary in the rulemaking process the federal courts
should take back, before federal rulemaking and civil litigation
become irretrievably balkanized and politicized.
The legal dimensions of this thesis, dealing with the constitutional basis of the Civil Justice Reform Act, the statutory
limits of the Rules Enabling Act, and separation of powers doctrine, are developed in a companion article that appears later in
this Volume of the Minnesota Law Review.24 The present Article, which lays the factual groundwork for demonstrating the
legal insufficiency of the Act, has a two-fold purpose: it captures the Act's radical nature and the counter-reformation in
procedural justice it represents, and describes the legislative
process that led to its enactment.
This Article is divided into three Parts. Part One, which
briefly narrates recent efforts at civil justice reform throughout
all branches of the federal government, views the Act as one dimension of a political agenda which seeks to impose a certain
vision of procedural justice at the federal level. This portion of
the Article describes the Civil Justice Reform Act, its empirical
24. Linda S. Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The Civil Justice
Reform Act and Separationof Powers, planned for 77 MINN. L. REV. - (June,
1993).
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and political foundations, and the requirements it imposes for
accomplishing civil justice reform in all federal district courts.
It also assesses the potential impact of the procedural innovations that local advisory groups must consider under the Act in
formulating civil justice reform plans and evaluates whether
their resulting implementation will accomplish the civil justice
25
goals Congress envisioned.
Part One also describes the Act's various requirements to
show the extensive rulemaking authority that Congress delegated to local advisory groups and the kinds of tasks the Act requires the advisory groups to accomplish in formulating their
plans. This demonstrates the widespread dispersal of procedural rulemaking to local amateur groups and the serious effects this dispersal is likely to have on access to federal courts
and on federal litigation practice. In addition to setting forth
the Act's varied requirements, this Part also indicates the haste
with which Congress acted on this major piece of legislation
and reveals the lack of reasoned debate surrounding its enactment. The purpose of this discussion is to illustrate the paucity
of meaningful discussion surrounding the Act's drafting and to
display how Congress debates, or rather fails to debate, important issues of constitutional law.
Part Two examines the legislative history relating to Congress's consideration of its constitutional authority to enact the
Civil Justice Reform Act and further delegate the procedural
rulemaking function to local advisory groups. Part Two focuses
on the lack of serious, considered discussion of the constitutional and statutory limits of congressional rulemaking authority. Despite opposition from the Judicial Conference of the
United States Courts and skepticism of the American Bar Association and the Department of Justice, Congress concluded that
it had exclusive rulemaking authority. This Part argues that
25. This section focuses on the legislation, rather than providing a detailed analysis of the plans and reports. For examples of articles addressing
plans and reports, see Robert Elder, Jr., Congress Catches Heat For Federal
Court Woes; Texas Districts Want More Money, Less Meddling, TEX. LAW.,
Jan. 27, 1991, at 4 (detailing reports and plans of Texas district courts under
Civil Justice Reform Act); Gordon Hunter, Judges Clog FederalDocket; Bench
Trial Rulings, Pending Motions Pile Up in Texas Courts, TEX. LAW., Nov. 18,
1991, at 1 (early assessment of district court judicial performance statistics required under Civil Justice Reform Act); and Christine E. Sherry, Section
Forms Task Force on Civil Justice Reform Act, 17 LITIG. NEWS, Dec. 1991, at 1
(reporting on ABA litigation section's creation of task force to study and evaluate civil justice reports and plans completed under the Civil Justice Reform
Act). See also sources cited supra note 9.
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Congress usurped procedural rulemaking authority, transgressed the Rules Enabling Act, and ignored the separation of
powers doctrine.
Part Three discusses the sources of congressional authority
articulated by the Senate Judiciary Committee to enact the
Civil Justice Reform Act. This Part questions the strength of
each rationale as a matter of legal theory, practice, and policy.
It suggests that congressional arguments based on the ideological rhetoric of participatory democracy do not support the delegation of rulemaking authority to local, non-expert advisory
groups.
Using this Article's factual background, the companion Article will address constitutional and statutory problems relating
to the Civil Justice Reform Act. It will discuss the underlying
theory of rulemaking allocation embodied in the Rules Enabling Act and the doctrinal precedents construing that statute.
It will also analyze the separation of powers doctrine as it relates to the allocation of substantive and procedural rulemaking
authority between the legislative and judicial branches.
The combined thesis of this Article and the companion
piece is that the Rules Enabling Act must be read to allocate
procedural rulemaking authority to the judicial branch. Under
no circumstances can that Act be read to confer procedural
rulemaking authority exclusively on Congress. Congress,
therefore, has overruled, sub silentio, the Rules Enabling Act
through the Civil Justice Reform Act. The Senate's interpretation of the Rules Enabling Act inverts the usual understanding
of that Act, and transforms it from enabling to disabling legislation. Further, this attempt to strip the judicial branch of its
procedural rulemaking authority under the guise of "substantive effects" violates the separation of powers doctrine, which
commits control over internal court housekeeping affairs, including the promulgation of procedural rules, to the judiciary.
Although this Article centers on the factual bases underlying the Civil Justice Reform Act and its companion Article
deals with constitutional and statutory arguments relating to
allocation of civil procedure rulemaking authority, this Article
ends with some brief observations as to why, as a matter of policy, procedural rulemaking authority ought to be vested in the
judicial, rather than the legislative, branch. It therefore revisits
the overarching theory of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
as well as the debate surrounding the relative fairness, compe-
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tency, and efficiency of the respective bodies to promulgate procedural rules.
This Article concludes that the Act ought to be repudiated
as a noble but ill-conceived piece of legislation that will produce
more harm than good for civil justice in this country. Civil procedural rulemaking ought not to be in the hands of ninety-four
local amateur rulemaking groups who are destined to wreak
mischief, if not havoc, on the federal court system. Procedural
rulemaking should be restored to the federal judiciary, to be accomplished in slow and deliberative fashion by procedural experts through the existing Advisory Committee system.
I.

UNDERSTANDING THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM

ACT OF 199026
The Civil Justice Reform Act must be understood against a
backdrop of the civil justice reform efforts that percolated
through all three branches of the federal government during
the late 1980s. This understanding is important because one of
the Act's stated purposes, according to its legislative history, is
to achieve justice from the "bottom up," from the "users" of
the system.2 7 The Act, as a matter of public relations, carries
with it a strong gloss of participatory democracy and civic dogoodism that is belied by a highly centralized effort to impose a
certain set of procedural reforms onto the civil justice system.
Thus, it is but one piece of an entire federal civil justice reform
agenda, consisting of virtually identical proposals, that has been
advanced in all three branches of government. Rather than
coming from the bottom up, this forced effort to accomplish
speedy civil justice reform is actually being pushed from the
top down.28
26. See supra note 7.
27. See S. REP. No. 416, supra note 3, at 14, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6817.
The broad membership of the planning groups and the overall
planning group mechanism outlined in the legislation will ensure that
the entire litigating community share in the development of the
plans. As Judge Enslen pointed out, "if the user committee assists in
drafting the plan, the users of the system are going to be all the more

interested in following it."
Id, at 15, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6818 (citation omitted); see also 136
CONG. REc. S416 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1990) (statement of Sen. Biden); Jeffrey J.
Peck, "Users United"." The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1991, at 105, 109-10 (discussing Sen. Biden's statement).
Mr. Peck is the staff director for the Senate Judiciary Committee and played a
major role in shepherding the Civil Justice Reform Act into law.
28. Compare Deborah R. Hensler, Taking Aim at the American Legal Sys-
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The legislative branch, through the Civil Justice Reform
Act, is requiring seemingly precipitous and urgent reform based
on a largely assumed crisis in the civil justice system. 29 The
Act reflects congressional frustration with the glacial pace of
procedural reform as accomplished through deliberative judicial rulemaking, 30 and demonstrates congressional demand for
immediate procedural justice reform without regard to statutory niceties or constitutional separation of powers problems.3 1
tern: The Council on Competitiveness'sAgenda for Legal Reform, 75 JUDIcA-

244 (1992) (criticizing the centralized reform movement) with Gregory B.
Butler & Brian D. Miller, Fiddling While Rome Burns: A Response to Dr.
Hensler, 75 JUDICATURE 251 (1992) (supporting Vice President Quayle's reform
proposals).
29. See Civil Justice Reform Act § 102, 28 U.S.C. § 471 note (Supp. II 1990)
(congressional findings). It is significant to note that the six "findings" reported by Congress rest on the unproven assumption that cost and delay is a
problem in all federal district courts. In none of its findings did Congress ever
document that there actually is a threshold problem of cost and delay. Thus,
Congress declared:
(1) The problems of cost and delay in civil litigation in any
United States district court must be addressed in the context of the
full range of demands made on the district court's resources by both
civil and criminal matters.
(2) The courts, the litigants, the litigants' attorneys, and the Congress and the executive branch, share responsibility for cost and delay
in civil litigation and its impact on access to the courts, adjudication of
cases on the merits, and the ability of the civil justice system to provide proper and timely judicial relief for aggrieved parties.
(3) The solutions to problems of cost and delay must include significant contributions by the courts, the litigants, the litigants' attorneys, and by the Congress and the executive branch.
(4) In identifying, developing, and implementing solutions to
problems of cost and delay in civil litigation, it is necessary to achieve
a method of consultation so that individual judicial officers, litigants,
and litigants' attorneys who have developed techniques for litigation
management and cost and delay reduction can effectively and
promptly communicate those techniques to all participants in the civil
justice system.
(5) Evidence suggests that an effective litigation management
and cost and delay reduction program should incorporate several interrelated principles ....
TURE

(6) Because the increasing volume and complexity of civil and
criminal cases imposes increasingly heavy workload burdens on judicial officers, clerks of court, and other court personnel, it is necessary
to create an effective administrative structure to ensure ongoing consultation and communication regarding effective litigation management and cost and delay reduction principles and techniques.
Id.
30.
31.

See Peck, supra note 27, at 114-16.
See id. Mr. Peck writes:
Regrettably ....
this battle over turf should not and need not
have occurred. It should not have occurred because the view that
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The executive branch, not content with the pace of reform
through congressional legislation, simultaneously pushed various procedural reform initiatives. An October 1991 Presidential
Executive Order imposed reforms similar to those of the Civil
Justice Reform Act on all executive branch departments and
agencies.3 2 Vice President Quayle's infamous August 1991 attack on the legal profession 33 was based on a report from the
court reform is somehow within the exclusive province of the courts
is erroneous as a matter of law and mistaken as a matter of policy
when, as here, the rulemaking process had not fully responded to the
range of civil litigation problems that existed....
W"
hat largely remained, then, was an objection to the congressional involvement in procedural reform that the bill represented. As
a matter of constitutional law, this argument, which is often cloaked
in separation of powers terms, is without merit.
Id. at 114.
32. See Exec. Order No. 12,788, 56 Fed. Reg. 55,195 (1991); see also Marshall J. Breger, Lawyers Must Lead the Way, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 18, 1991, at 15
(commenting on Exec. Order No. 12,788 as it relates to civil justice reform in
federal agencies); Theodore Olson, Top-Down Civil JusticeReform, TEX. LAw.,
Feb. 17, 1992, at 16 (discussing Exec. Order No. 12,788).
33. See Text of Address by Vice President Dan Quayle at the Annual
Meeting of the American Bar Association, Atlanta, Georgia, FED. NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 13, 1991 availablein LEXIS, Nexis library, Fednew file. Vice President Quayle's speech has permeated the media. See, e.g., Bashing Lawyers.
Also Justice,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1992, at 22 (responding negatively to Quayle's
speech); Andrew Blum, ABA Takes Softer Stand on Quayle; Upset Staffers,
NAT'L L.J., Oct. 14, 1991, at 3 (discussing reaction to Quayle's ABA speech on
civil justice reform); Steven Brostoff, Push by Bush Urges on Tort Reform
Movement, PROp. & CASUALTY/EMPLOYEE BENEFITS EDITION, Sept. 2, 1991, at
5 (discussing reaction to Quayle's speech and tort reform movement); Dawn
Ceol, Quayle Urges Reform of Civil Justice System, WAsH. TIMES, Aug. 14,
1991, at A4 (reporting Quayle's speech); Rupert Cornwell, U.S. Plans Radical
Legal Reforms, THE INDEPENDENT, Aug. 14, 1991, at 10 (reporting Quayle's
speech); The Costs of Lawyering, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Aug. 19, 1991, at 20
(reacting positively to Quayle's speech); Firs4 Sock the Lawyers, 23 NAT'L J.
2041 (Aug. 17, 1991) (reporting on Quayle's speech); Mary Jane Fisher, Civil
Justice Reform PlanIntroduced by VP Quayle, PROP. & CASUALTY/EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS EDITION, Aug. 19, 1991, at 1 (discussing reaction Quayle's speech and
support from insurance groups); For the Record, WASH. POST., Aug. 15, 1991, at
A20 (quoting excerpts from Quayle's speech to ABA); Milo Geyelin, Quayle's
Data in Proposed Reform of Legal System Called Misleading, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 4, 1992, at B7 (discussing criticism of empirical data in Quayle's speech);
Milo Geyelin, Quayle Faces Powerful Foes on Law Reform, WALL ST. J., Dec.
12, 1991, at B1 (reporting on the emerging corporate opponents of Quayle's
proposals); Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., Bush Report Not All That Controversial,
NAT'L L.J., Dec. 16, 1991, at 13 (commenting on the limited scope of Quayle's
proposals); Julie Johnson, Do We Have Too Many Lawyers?, TIME, Aug. 26,
1991, at 54 (noting pro-business bias of proposed Quayle's reform efforts);
David Margolick, Address by Quayle on Justice Proposals Irks Bar Association, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1991, at Al (reporting on Quayle's speech and opposition to proposals); Quayle Outlines Recommendations for Reforming
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President's Council on Competitiveness, entitled Agenda for
Civil Justice Reform in America,3 that contained substantially
the same package of procedural reforms set forth in both the
Civil Justice Reform Act and the President's Executive Order
35
on civil justice reform.
Indeed, it is striking that similar, if not identical, recommendations concerning civil litigation had been advanced in all
three branches of government in the early 1990s. The proposals
focus on tighter managerial control over pre-trial proceedings,
curbing discovery abuse, and mandatory recourse to alternative
dispute resolution techniques; some make recommendations regarding further control over attorneys' fees and punitive damages.3 6 These proposals raise interesting problems relating to
party autonomy, managerial judging, access to federal courts,
37
and the right to adversarial dispute resolution.
A. BACKGROUND AND PoLIcy
Two signal events occurred in 1990 regarding the delivery
of civil justice in the United States federal court system. First,
the Federal Courts Study Committee, a group of lawyers and
lay persons Chief Justice Rehnquist appointed at the direction
of Congress to study the problems of the federal courts, issued
the Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee.3 At the
outset, the Report noted that in authorizing the study, Congress
was responding to "mounting public and professional concern
with the federal courts' congestion, delay, expense, and expanProductLiability, 53 WKLY. Bus. AVIATION, Aug. 19, 1991, at 74 (reporting on
Quayle's speech and products liability tort reform); Greg Rushford, Touting
Tort Reform, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 2, 1991, at 5 (reporting on favorable responses to Quayle's speech); Martin Scram, Call it Danforth in the Lawyers'
Den, NEWSDAY, Aug. 29, 1991, at 126 (reacting favorably to Quayle's speech);
Taking the Lead, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 4, 1991, at 12 (reacting positively to Quayle's
speech); Roush Vance, New Bar Chief Wants to Boost Image ofAttorneys and
Promote Professionalism, MICH. L. WKLY., Sept. 23, 1991, at S3B (reporting
comments at Michigan State Bar meeting on Quayle's speech and decline in
professionalism).
34. AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM, supra note 16; see also Avern
Cohn, Civil-JusticeReport Flawed, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 23, 1991, at 28 (letter to
the editor criticizing Quayle's speech and the AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE
REFORM).

35. See AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM, supra note 16.
36. See e.g., id. at 32 (discussing punitive damages); Exec. Order No.
12,788, 56 Fed. Reg. 55,197 (1991) (discussing fees and expenses in § 1(h)).
37. These important topics are largely outside the scope of this Article.
For a description of some of the problems with the Quayle proposals, see Hensler, supra note 28.
38.

REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE (Apr. 2, 1990).
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sion." 39 The product of fifteen months work, the Report comprehensively described the state of the federal judiciary,
analyzed problems besetting the federal court system, and profor reforming judicial
posed a set of detailed recommendations
40
administration and federal procedure.
Second, the Brookings Institution Task Force on Civil Justice Reform issued its report, Justice for All: Reducing Costs
and Delays in Civil Litigation.41 At Senator Joseph R. Biden,
Jr.'s request, the Brookings Institution had assembled a seemingly diverse task force42 that met over a two-year period to discuss problems of civil justice. In contrast to the Federal Court
Study Committee's Report, the Brookings-Biden report focused
more narrowly on civil litigation. It contained a series of
sweeping recommendations for reform of the civil justice
system.
The Brookings-Biden report provided the basis for Title I
of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, 43 the Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990. 44 The Act requires every federal district
39. Id. at 3.
40. Id. at 3-28 (overview); cf Civil Justice Reform Act § 102, 28 U.S.C.
§ 471 note (Supp. II 1990) (findings); 28 U.S.C. § 473 (Supp. II 1990) (content of
civil justice expense and delay reduction plans).

41. BROOKINGS INsT., JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS AND DELAYS IN
CIVIL LITIGATION (1989).
42. The task force represented varying interests within the civil justice
system, including "plaintiff's and defense bar, civil and womens' rights lawyers, attorneys representing consumer and environmental organizations, representatives of the insurance industry, general counsels of major corporations,
former judges and law professors." Id. at vii; see also S. REP. No. 416, supra
note 3, at 13, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6816 (discussing the task force).
Despite the apparent diversity of the task force, its membership was heavily
weighted with corporate and insurance interests. See BROOKINGS INST., supra
note 41, at 45-49 (listing members of the task force and their affiliations).
43.

See supra note 3.

44. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650 §§ 101-105, 104
Stat. 5089-98 (1990) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. II 1990)). See generally Mark Ballard, Bill to Add U.S. Judges Shortchanges Texas by 6; Legislation Would Add 3 New Courts in Southern District,1 in Western District,
TEX. LAW., June 18, 1990, at 4 (commenting on earlier version of the bill);
Biden Introduces Court Reform Bill, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1990, at A2 (announcing of Civil Justice Reform Act); David Bauman, Biden Unveils Litigation Bill, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 25, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, GNS File (discussing Biden bill); Marcia Coyle & Marianne Lavelle,
Conference O.K 's Plan to Cut Court Costs, Delays, NAT'L L.J., May 21, 1990, at
5 (noting Judicial Conference opposition to Civil Justice Reform Act and setting forth conference's own proposals); Marcia Coyle & Fred Strasser, Senate
Sets its Sights on Delays in Civil Trials, NAT'L L.J., July 23, 1990, at 5 (discussing Biden bill and noting opposition from the Judicial Conference of the
United States Courts and the American Bar Association); Stephen Labaton,
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across the country to develop and implement a civil justice plan
to reduce costs and delay within the district.45 The legislative
history indicates that the central purpose of the Civil Justice
Reform Act is to accomplish the often stated but frequently
unachieved goal of Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: to ensure the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination" of civil disputes in federal courts. 4 6 The legislative history
notes that "[h]igh costs, long delays and insufficient judicial resources all too often leave this time-honored promise unfulfilled. By improving the quality of the process of civil litigation,
of the quality of
this legislation will contribute to improvement
' '47
justice that the civil justice system delivers.
Congress suggested that the federal courts "are suffering
today under the scourge of two related and worsening
plagues. ' 48 The first-high costs of litigation and delays that
contribute to high costs-limits access to federal courts to only
the wealthy and lessens the ability of American corporations to
compete at home and abroad. 49 The second-a scarcity of fiBusiness and the Law; Biden's Challenge to Federal Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
16, 1990, at D2 (reporting on Civil Justice Reform Act and opposition from
Federal judges); Legislation: Mixed Bag of Changes Designed to Improve FederalPractice,59 U.S.L.W. 2419 (January 15, 1991) (describing provisions of Judicial Improvements Act of 1990); Peck, supra note 27, at 107-09 (discussing
the history of the Act); Proceed with Caution, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 8, 1990, at 6
(criticizing Brookings Report and Civil Justice Reform Act); Richard A. Rothman, Civil Justice Reform Act" Too Little, Too Fast,N.Y. L.J., Apr. 17, 1990, at
2 (noting early criticism of Civil Justice Reform Act).
45. Civil Justice Reform Act § 103(b), 28 U.S.C. § 471 note (Supp. II 1990).
46. FED. R. Civ. P. 1. Echoing this trilogy of values, the Senate legislative
history of the Civil Justice Reform Act states that the purpose of the legislation "is to promote for all citizens-rich or poor, individual or corporation,
plaintiff or defendant-the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of civil disputes in our Nation's Federal courts." S. REP. No. 416, supra note 3, at 1, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6804.
Although Congress, in the legislative history, identified three fundamental
values, the Civil Justice Reform Act itself focuses exclusively on two: cost and
delay. The independent value of justice is absent from the statutory mandate,
and by inference, it must be assumed that Congress equated reducing cost and
delay with achieving justice.
The lack of a definition of justice, or any further reference to justice in
the legislation supplying the framework for civil justice reform disturbed some
members serving on advisory groups, as well as judges interviewed during the
course of evaluating conditions in the districts. See Mullenix, supra note 7, at
199; see also CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY GROUP OF THE U.S. DIST.
COURT FOR THE S. DIST. OF TEX., supra note 1, at B-5.
47. See S. REP. No. 416, supra note 3, at 1, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6804.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1-2, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6804. The theme that civil
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nancial resources dedicated to the federal court system-results
in a shortage of federal judges. This shortage, in turn, increases
costs and results in delay, especially in federal courts with congested criminal dockets and high drug-related caseloads.50
The Civil Justice Reform Act is intended to address these
two problems in what Congress deemed a "comprehensive and
straightforward fashion." 5' Six cornerstone principles animate
this legislative program:
(1) building reform from the 'bottom up';
(2) promulgating a national, statutory policy in support of judicial
case management;
(3) imposing greater controls on the discovery process;
(4) establishing differentiated case management systems;
(5) improving motions practice and reducing undue delays associated
with decisions on motions; and
(6) expanding 52 and enhancing the use of alternative dispute
resolution.

The Senate Judiciary Committee ultimately recast these
six principles as the findings supporting Title I of the Civil Justice Reform Act.5 3 As a result of these findings, Congress has
required each federal district court to promulgate a "civil justice expense and delay reduction plan."' 4
Congress made two key policy decisions regarding civil justice reform within the federal system. The first was that reform is to be accomplished locally, based on the
recommendations of district-wide community advisory groups,
including not only federal court personnel, but also lawyers and
clients-"those who must live with the civil justice system on a
5 5 This decision recognized the "remarkable
regular basis."1
justice reform is needed to combat decreased American competitiveness in the
global economy underlies Vice President Quayle's address to the American
Bar Association and the AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM. See supra notes
33-34.
50. See S. REP. No. 416, supra note 3, at 1-2, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6804.

51. Id.
52. Id. at 14, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6817; see also Peck, supra
note 27, at 109-12 (describing the cornerstone principles of the legislation and
their translation into statutory mandates to the advisory groups).
53. See Civil Justice Reform Act § 102, 28 U.S.C. § 471 note (Supp. II
1990).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 471 (Supp. II 1990).
55. 136 CONG. REC. S416 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1990) (statement of Sen.
Biden). This policy decision was based on a recommendation from the Brookings Institution, cited in the Act's legislative history: "[The wide participation
of those who use and are involved in the court system in each district will not
only maximize the prospects that workable plans will be developed, but will
also stimulate a much-needed dialogue between the bench, bar, and client
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number of gifted and talented" personnel within the local federal districts, as well as the idea that people involved in reform
56
efforts will have a greater interest in carrying out the reform.
The second decision, tied to decentralized reform, was to
promulgate a national, statutory policy in support of judicial
case management more extensive than what the current federal rules require. 57 This decision was predicated on the conclusion that early and increased judicial supervision over
litigation results in more expeditious and less costly disposition
of civil cases. Thus, the Act's legislative history states, "[a]s the
number of cases has increased and the cases themselves have
become increasingly complex, judges, court administrators, and
other civil justice system experts have recognized the imporearly, active, and continuous control
tance of courts exercising
58
over case progress."
The other guiding principles for civil justice reform flow
from this congressional directive to formulate a nationwide program of vigorous civil case management. The Act's legislative
history stresses the importance of early judicial pretrial involvement, setting early and firm trial dates, enhancing use of
magistrates, imposing greater controls on the discovery process,
establishing differentiated case management systems, reforming motions practice, and expanding and enhancing the use
of alternative dispute resolution techniques.5 9
B.

STATUTORY

TASKS

FOR THE ADVISORY GROUPS

The Civil Justice Reform Act requires each federal district
court to implement a civil justice expense and delay reduction
plan within three years of the statute's enactment. 60 In addition, the legislation designates three categories of courts to participate in accomplishing this reform: pilot districts, 61 early
communities about methods for streamlining litigation practice." S. REP. No.
416, supra note 3, at 14, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6817 (quoting
BROOKINGS INST., supra note 41, at 12).

56. See S. REP. No. 416, supra note 3, at 15, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6817-18; see also supra note 27 (discussing planning group membership and
process).
57. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 16 (describing judicial pretrial management
techniques).
58. See S. REP. No. 416, supra note 3, at 16, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6819.
59. Id. at 18-30, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6821-33.
60. Civil Justice Reform Act § 103(b), 28 U.S.C. § 471 note (Supp. II 1990).
61. Id.§ 105.
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63
implementation districts, 62 and demonstration districts.
The statute requires the Judicial Conference of the United
States to designate ten "Pilot Districts," at least five of which
had to encompass metropolitan areas.6 The courts for these
districts were required to write expense and delay reduction reports and plans that conform to the Act's requirements and to
implement the plans by December 31, 1991. The statute instructs the pilot districts to include the "six principles and
guidelines" identified in the Act 65 in their civil justice reform
plans. That statute also requires the plans to remain in effect
for at least three years.66 As of December 31, 1991, the ten pilot
districts, in compliance with the Act, had completed their re67
ports and plans.
Early implementation districts consist of other federal district courts that voluntarily undertook to formulate and implement a civil reform plan by December 31, 1991 under the
statutory guidelines. 68 The Act provides that any district seeking early implementation status could apply to the Judicial

62. Id. § 103(c).
63. I& § 104.
64.

Id. § 105(b)(2).

65. 1& § 105 (b)(1).
66. Id § 105(b)(3).
67. See ADVISORY COMM. OF THE U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE S. DIST. OF
CAL., REPORT AND PLAN (Oct. 18, 1991); ADVISORY GROUP APPOINTED PURSUANT TO THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990 TO THE U.S. DIST. COURT FOR
THE DIST. OF DEL., FINAL REPORT (Oct. 1, 1991), and U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE
DIST. OF DEL., supra note 10; ADVISORY GROUP FOR THE U.S. DIST. COURT FOR
THE N. DIST. OF GA. APPOINTED UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT, RE-

PORT (Sept. 30, 1991), and U.S DIST. COURT FOR THE N. DIST. OF GA., CIVIL
JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN PURSUANT TO THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990 (Dec. 17, 1991); SOUTHERN DIST. OF N.Y. CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY GROUP, supra note 10; ADVISORY GROUP OF THE
U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE W. DIST. OF OKLA. APPOINTED UNDER THE CIVIL
JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990, supra note 10; ADVISORY GROUP OF THE U.S.

DIST. COURT FOR THE E. DIST. OF PA. APPOINTED UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE
REFORM ACT OF 1990, REPORT (Aug. 1, 1991), and U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE E.
DIST. OF PA., CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (Dec. 31,
1991); CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY GROUP FOR THE U.S. DIST. COURT
FOR THE W. DIST. OF TENN., supra note 12; CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY GROUP OF THE U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE S. DIST. OF TEX., supra note 1,
and U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE S. DIST. OF TEX., COST AND DELAY REDUCTION

PLAN UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990 (Oct. 24, 1991); ADVISORY GROUP FOR THE U.S. DIST. COURT FOR UTAH, REPORT AND PLAN (1991);
U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE E. DIST. OF WIS., CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN ADOPTED PURSUANT TO THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT

OF 1990 (Dec. 1991).
68. See Civil Justice Reform Act § 103(c), 28 U.S.C. § 471 note (Supp. II
1990).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:375

Conference for additional resources to implement the plans. 69
Twenty-four districts had qualified as early implementation districts by December 31, 1991.70
The statute designates five demonstration districts.71 The
statute assign courts in two of these districts the task of experimenting with "differentiated case management" systems and
the courts in three of the districts the task of experimenting
with alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. 72 The statute
indicates that any designated demonstration district could also
seek to qualify as an early implementation district.73 Four of
the five demonstration districts qualified as early implementa74
tion districts by December 31, 1991.
The Civil Justice Reform Act requires each district court,
within ninety days of the statute's enactment, to appoint an advisory group charged with carrying out the statute's mandates. 75 The Act requires that this group be balanced by the
inclusion of "attorneys and other persons who are representa69.

Id § 103(c)(2). The statute also requires the Judicial Conference to

prepare, within eighteen months after enactment of the law, a report on the
plans "developed and implemented" in the early implementation districts. See
id. § 103(c)(3).
70. CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT REPORT, supra note 6, at 2. These are
United States district courts for Alaska, the Eastern District of Arkansas, the
Eastern and Northern Districts of California, the Southern District of Florida,
the District of Idaho, the Southern District of Illinois, the Northern and
Southern Districts of Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, the Western District of
Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, the Eastern District of New York, the Northern District of Ohio, Oregon, the Eastern District of Texas, the Virgin Islands,
the Eastern District of Virginia, the Northern and Southern Districts of West
Virginia, the Western District of Wisconsin, and the District of Wyoming. The
ten pilot districts are also considered early implementation districts. Id at 1.
The Western District of Texas adopted and submitted a Report to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts after December 31, 1991.
71. Civil Justice Reform Act § 104(b), 28 U.S.C. 471 note (Supp. II 1990).
These districts are the Western District of Maryland, the Northern District of
Ohio, the Northern District of California, the Northern District of West Virginia, and the Western District of Missouri. Id.
72. Id. Congress requires the Judicial Conference to study and evaluate
the merits of these demonstration districts' programs and to report to it no
later than December 31, 1995. Id. § 104(c)-(d).
73. Id. at § 104(a)(2).
74. CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT REPORT, supra note 6, at 23. These districts are the Northern District of Ohio, the Northern District of California,
the Northern District of West Virginia, and the Western District of Michigan.
Id. at app. I.
75. 28 U.S.C. § 478(a) (Supp. II 1990). The statute authorizes the chief
judge of each district court to choose the members of the advisory groups, after consultation with the other judges of the court. Id. In the Southern District of Texas, each judge nominated a candidate for the advisory group.
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tive of major categories of litigants"7 6 in the court; the statute
designates the district's United States Attorney as the only permanent advisory committee member.7 7 The statute grants continuing existence of the advisory groups after they complete
their statutory tasks of writing a report and civil justice reform
plan. 78 The statute did not, however, describe in detail what
continuing functions the advisory groups are to perform for the
79
district courts.
The Civil Justice Reform Act confers three basic tasks on
the advisory groups: assessing the condition of the district's
civil and criminal dockets,8 0 evaluating the reasons for the district's litigation cost and delay, 81 and formulating recommendations addressing case backlog and the expense of civil
litigation.8 2 The ten pilot district advisory groups proceeded
under the legislative mandate not only to comply with all the
statute's provisions for creation of civil justice expense and delay reduction plans, but additionally to include as part of their
plans "the [six] principles and guidelines of litigation manage84
83
ment and cost and delay reduction" identified in the Act.
76. Id § 478(b).
77. Id. § 478(d) (requiring the United States Attorney for each judicial district, or his or her designee, to be a permanent member of the advisory group).
In some districts, the presence of the United Attorney on the advisory group
created contention over issues relating to the state of the criminal docket and
prosecutorial discretion. See, e.g., Garry Sturgess, Another Clash Over C-iminal Caseload, LEGAL TIMES, April 1, 1991, at 7 (discussing tensions within the
Advisory Group for the District of Columbia with regard to prosecution of
criminal drug offenses). The District of Columbia was not one of the ten pilot
district courts, but had begun its work as an advisory group. Id.
78. See 28 U.S.C. § 478(d) (Supp. II 1990) (providing that no member of an
advisory group shall serve for longer than four years).
79. Section 475 is the only section of the Act that addresses this issue. It
provides that advisory groups should be consulted when the district conducts
mandatory periodic assessments of their civil and criminal dockets. Id. § 475.
80. Id. § 472(c)(1).
81. Id. § 472(c)(1)(C)-(D).
82. Id. § 473. This section of the Act recommends in detail, procedural innovations for the Advisory Groups to consider in developing their civil justice
reform plans. Id.
83. Civil Justice Reform Act § 105(b)(1), 28 U.S.C. 471 note (Supp. II
1990).
84. See 28 U.S.C. § 473 (Supp. II 1990) (detailing recommended and required content of civil justice expense and delay reduction plans). This section, the heart of the Act, delineates a long list of recommended and required
procedural innovations. Subsections (a) and (b) indicate that the advisory
groups "shall consider and may include" a variety of procedural techniques to
manage litigation and reduce cost and delay. The techniques include differential case management; undertaking early and ongoing pretrial judicial case
management; setting early, firm trial dates; controlling and closely monitoring
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The statute assigns two distinct tasks to the advisory
groups: writing reports that set forth the conditions in the district,8 5 and formulating civil justice reform plans to address
those conditions. 86 To date, most pilot and early implementation districts have issued separate reports and plans.8 7 The
plans typically distill new local rules, measures, or programs
that districts are implementing to reduce cost and delay.88
C.

WHILE AMERICA SLEPT: OF PROBLEMATIC SOCIAL SCIENCE
AND RULEMAKING
Procedure has always been a whipping boy upon which those
anxious to secure prompt, sometimes summary, adjudication of rights
vent their spleen over so-called delays.
Justice Stanley Reed 89

Writing in laudatory terms regarding the speed with which
Congress enacted the Civil Justice Reform Act, the Senate Judiciary Committee's staff director noted:
The process by which this legislation became the law of the land
is equally significant.... Less than twelve months passed between
the introduction of the Act and its enactment-a rather remarkable
feat, even the critics of the Act must concede, in an area of the law in
which reform has been both incremental in scope and languid in pace.
Action that typically occupies several years and multiple Congresses
90
took only one year and only one session of a single Congress.
the scope and extent of discovery; setting timetables for disposition of motions;
managing complex cases; providing for voluntary disclosure; and referring parties to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.
85. 1d. § 472(b) (requiring advisory groups to submit reports to their district courts and that these reports be available to the public). The legislation
indicates that the advisory committee reports must include an assessment of
the docket, the basis for the advisory committee's recommendations, recommended measures, rules, and programs, and an explanation of the way in
which the recommended measures, rules and programs comply with § 473,
which dictates the contents of civil justice reform plans. 1d.
86. Id. §§ 471, 472(a).
87. See, e.g., supra notes 10-12, 67, 70 (reports and plans). Some districts
have issued combined reports and plans.
88. See, e.g., supra notes 10-12, 67.
89. The Rule-Making Function and The JudicialConference of the United
States, supra note 8, at 133.
90. Peck, supra note 27, at 106. Mr. Peck attributed the expedited passage
of the law to three factors: "(1) careful and deliberate study [that] preceded
legislative action; (2) consensus ... with common opponents forging an unprecedented alliance;" and "(3) under Senator Biden's stewardship reasonable
compromise outlasted stubborn resistance." Id
The "careful and deliberate study" refers to the Louis Harris survey that
supplied the empirical basis for the Brookings-Biden report. This report was
completed in a very short time-frame, and is subject to methodological chal-
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At least one witness before the Senate Judiciary Committee noted that the Civil Justice Reform Act was the "sleeper"
legislation of the year.9 1 This is an apt metaphor: while
America slept, Congress pressed into law an Act that fundamentally affects procedural and substantive justice in the federal courts. The Act was stealth legislation, swiftly following
the Brookings-Biden task force report, a report based on a
questionable empirical study9 2 commissioned by reform proponents whose task force included no sitting federal judges. 9 3
The Senate and House held three legislative hearings with
witnesses who were largely predisposed to accept the Brookings-Biden report and its recommendations.9 4 Indeed, task
lenge. As was true throughout this legislative reform effort, the Harris survey
questions assumed the problem it was seeking to define. See Louis HARRIs
AND ASSOCIATES, INC., PROCEDURAL REFORi OF THE CIVIL JusTICE SYSTEM, A
STUDY CONDUCTED FOR: THE FOUNDATION FOR CHANGE, INC. (March 1989),
reprintedin The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 and The JudicialImprovements Act of 1990: HearingsBefore The Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 91-184 (1990) [hereinafter Senate Hearings].
The "unprecedented alliance" that was forged in support of the legislation
was actually an alliance that was forged in support of the Brookings-Biden
task force and report; the same people who worked for the task force reappeared to support the legislation. Notwithstanding the self-description of diversity by that task force and the Senate Judiciary Committee, the BrookingBiden Task force was heavily weighted with corporate and insurance interests.
See supra note 42 (discussing task force membership).
As to the "reasonable compromise" that outlasted the "stubborn resistance," the questions the Judicial Conference of the United States Courts
raised in its testimony can hardly be characterized as "stubborn resistance."
See discussion infra Part II.B. If anything, the questions the Conference
presented regarding basic constitutional authority were rather weakly asserted
and not vigorously pursued by the Conference's representatives to the legislative hearings. The Judicial Conference's objections simply were disregarded,
belying the notion that Senator Biden and his staff forged a compromise that
saved the day. See discussion infra Part II.
91. Senate Hearings,supra note 90, at 55 (testimony of Mr. Patrick Head)
92. See supra note 90 (discussing the Harris survey).
93. See Senate Hearings,supra note 90, at 329 ("[N]o active judicial officer

was asked to serve on the task force") (statement by Judge Robert F.
Peckham, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal., on behalf of

the Judicial Conference, regarding Title I of S.2648 Civil Justice Expense and
Delay Reduction Plans).
94. See Senate Hearings,supra note 90 at 2, 307 (hearings held on March 6
and June 26, 1990); Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act and
Civil Justice Reform Act" Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary,101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) [hereinafter House Hearing].
Of the ten witnesses who appeared before the two Senate hearings, only
six witnesses supported the bill, and five of the six were members of the
Brookings-Biden task force. See infra note 95. Only one federal judge, Judge
Richard A. Enslen, testified in support of the bill. See Senate Hearings,supra
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force members appeared at the hearings to endorse their own
previous efforts and proposals.9 5 The Senate and House committees called few witnesses from the broader community of
those interested in federal practice and procedure. The Act's
legislative record is devoid of any contributions from other or96
ganizations interested in problems of judicial administration,
or from the scholarly community that regularly teaches and
note 90, at 227-84 (testimony and prepared statement of Judge Richard A. Enslen).
Three disfavoring witnesses were federal judges, none of whom had been
members of the Brookings-Biden task force. See id. at 360-76 (testimony, prepared statement, letter, and response to written questions of Judge Diana E.
Murphy, president of the Federal Judges Association); id& at 319-48, 397-404
(testimony, prepared statement, and response to written questions of Judge
Robert F. Peckham, representing the Judicial Conference of the United
States); id at 208-25, 288-305 (testimony, prepared statement, and response to
written questions of Judge Aubrey E. Robinson Jr., representing the Judicial
Conference of the United States). A fourth witness, Judge Walter T. McGovern, testified only in support of the additional judgeships proposed in Title II
of S. 2648 as essential in achieving any improvements in the handling of the
civil docket. See id at 349-60, 405 (testimony and prepared statement of Judge
Walter T. McGovern, representing the Judicial Conference of the United
States).
95. See, e.g., Senate Hearings,supra note 90, at 8-28, 45-46, 82-84, 202-07
(testimony, prepared statement, and response to written questions of Mr. Patrick Head, vice president and general counsel of the FMC Corporation, and
former general counsel of Montgomery Ward); id at 29-32, 196-97 (testimony
and response to written questions of Mr. Gene Kimmelman, legislative director of the Consumer Federation of America); i&i at 377-90 (testimony and written statement of Mr. Carl Liggio, general counsel of Ernst & Young and
former chairman of the Board of the American Corporate Counsel Association); id at 41-44, 50-53, 189-95 (testimony, prepared statement, and response
to written questions of Mr. Stephen Middlebrook, senior vice president and
general counsel of Aetna Life & Casualty and member of the Executive Committee of the American Corporate Counsel Association); id at 36-41 (testimony of Mr. Bill Wagner, personal injury and wrongful death trial attorney
and president of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America). Several of
these witnesses also appeared in the House Hearing,supra note 94.
96. Other possible groups that might have been consulted during the
drafting stages include: the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, the American Bankruptcy Institute, the Lawyers Conference of the
American Bar Association, the Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities of the American Bar Association, the Section of Litigation of the American Bar Association, the Section of Tort and Insurance Practice of the
American Bar Association, the American College of Trial Lawyers, the American Judicature Society, the Conference of State Court Administrators, the
Council of Chief Judges of Intermediate Appellate Courts, the National Association for Court Management, the National Association of Attorneys General,
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the National Association of Women Judges, the National Bankruptcy Conference, the National Bar
Association, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
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writes about federal practice and procedure.9 7
In addition, the Act was drafted without consultation from
a variety of constituencies that might have been interested in
the legislation, including organizations devoted to the study of
judicial administration, public interest groups, 98 state attorney
generals' organizations, public defender services, the criminal
bar, and the Department of Justice. 99 The Senate also proceeded without initial consultation with the judicial branch and
completely ignored the judicial rulemaking bodies until the Judicial Conference raised a significant protest. 0 0
The lack of congressional responsiveness to the concerns of
the judiciary is striking. 10 Judicial Conference representatives
found it necessary to appear three times to question the haste
with which the Senate drafted the legislation, to question the
Senate Judiciary subcommittee's exclusion of federal judges
from a process that intimately affected their courts' internal affairs, and to question Congress's presumed general authority to
enact a bill so intricately involved with procedural rulemak03
ing.102 Six federal judges wrote to oppose the legislation,
Laws, the National Conference of State Legislators, the National District Attorneys Association, and the National Legal Aid and Defender Association.
By defining the crisis of civil justice as one concerned with making the
American business community more competitive, the Senate Judiciary committee formulated a narrow concept of the civil justice problem which excluded the insights of the diverse communities generally concerned with
judicial administration. The Senate's narrow perspective failed to comprehend
civil justice reform as part of a larger picture of justice reform that includes
problems of criminal justice administration and the relationship between state
and federal courts.
97. Cf Court Reform and Access to Justice Act. HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. III-IV (1987,
1988) [hereinafter Court Reform and Access to Justice Act Hearings] (witnesses and additional materials submitted in relation to proposed legislation).
98. But see Senate Hearings,supra note 90, at 474-77 (letter from Alan B.
Morrison, Public Citizen Litigation Group).
99. See id. at 81 (statement of Sen. Charles E. Grassley, commenting on
severity of criminal docket and the lack of Justice Department consultation
and participation in drafting and testifying on the legislation).
100. See id. at 208-210.
101. But see S. REP. No. 416, supra note 3, at 4, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6806 (asserting that "[tihe Judicial Conference . . . was involved extensively with the committee as it considered the Civil Justice legislation .

.

.

. [M]any of the Conference's specific suggestions have been

incorporated into S.2648 as amended.").
102. See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 90, at 91-184, 319-76, 208-25;
House Hearing,supra note 94, at 103-44 (testimony and prepared statement of
Judge Robert F. Peckham, on behalf of the Judicial Conference).
103. See House Hearing, supra note 94, at 372-83 (letter from Judge J.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:375

10 4
while only two wrote in support.
The sniping between the legislative and judicial branches
forms a troubling undercurrent to the Act that makes interesting reading in the legislative history. 0 5 This dispute is symptomatic of the tension relating to the allocation of procedural
rulemaking authority between these branches. 0 6 Apart from
the inherent interest in the spectacle of a senator venting irritation at a Judicial Conference representative, 0 7 the exchanges
between congressional committee members and Judicial Conference representatives suggest the lack of seriousness Congress accorded the statutory and constitutional questions
involved in promulgating the Act. 0 8
The haste with which Congress acted in passing the legislation, as well as the haste the Act itself demands for accomplishing its mandated reforms, are destined to bedevil Congress's
stated goal of improving federal civil justice administration.
The immediate result of this haste is a bad piece of legislation,
based on questionable social science, lobbied through Congress
at the behest of a small group of reformists with a particular
civil justice agenda. This legislative haste has set in motion
ninety-four amateur advisory groups that, without any previous
rulemaking experience, are performing tasks they are illequipped to handle. In the ten pilot districts, the expedited
schedule for filing the required reports and plans has in some
instances encouraged hurried empirical studies accompanied by
dubious analysis and conclusions. 0 9 In the long-term, the rush
to reform will contribute to poorly-drafted, problematic rules

Fredrick Motz, Dist. of Md.); id. at 384-91 (letter and memorandum from
Judge William L. Hungate, E. Dist. of Mo.); id. at 393-97 (memorandum from
Judge William M. Hoeveler, Chair, National Conference of Federal Trial
Judges); id. at 417-25 (comments of Chief Judge William J. Bauer on behalf of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit); id. at 431-33 (letter from Judge G. Thomas Eisele on behalf of the Eighth Circuit Judicial Conference); id. at 434-437 (letter from Chief Judge Barefoot Sanders, N. Dist. of
Tex.).
104. See Senate Hearings,supra note 90, at 478 (letter of Chief Judge John
F. Gerry, Dist. of N.J., reporting the unanimous support of the New Jersey
District Court Judges for the revised version of the bill); id. at 479 (letter from
Judge Dickinson R. Debevoise, Newark, New Jersey).
105. See id. at 309-11 (statement of Sen. Biden regarding negotiations on
the legislation).
106. Id. at 309-11; see also S. REP. No. 416, supra note 3, at 4-5, 9, reprinted
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N at 6807, 6811.
107. See Senate Hearings,supra note 90, at 309 (statement of Sen. Biden).
108. See infra text accompanying notes 138-48.
109. See CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY GROUP OF THE U.S. DIST.
COURT FOR THE S. DIST. OF TEX., supra note 1.
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that will be easily challenged, thereby defeating Congress's
overarching goal of reducing cost and delay in the federal
courts.
With pluralistic zeal, Congress sought to confer rulemaking
power on local citizens' groups and the system's so-called
"users."' 1 0 In hindsight, it now seems absurd that Congress
created ninety-four miniature social-science think-tanks
throughout the federal judiciary and entrusted these groups
with tasks that lay groups cannot perform with any intellectual
rigor. For example, Congress ordered the advisory groups to
"9promptly complete a thorough assessment of the state of the
court's civil and criminal docket."11' 1 In so doing, Congress required the advisory groups to
determine the condition of the civil and criminal dockets... to identify trends in case filings and in the demands on the court's resources
... [to] identify the principal causes of cost and delay in civil litigation
...
[and to] examine the extent to which costs and delays could be
reduced by a better assessment of the impact of new legislation on the
112
courts.

It is even more startling that Congress failed to discuss adequately the impact of crowded criminal dockets on the flow of
civil litigation in relation to reforming the civil justice system. 113 In many districts, the major reason for the backlog of
the civil docket is the Speedy Trial Act requirement that criminal cases be heard expeditiously.1 1 4 Thus, Congress chose not
to recognize that increased numbers of criminal prosecutions
are a major cause of cost and delay in civil litigation, something
that is not necessarily an intrinsic part of the civil litigation
115
process.
For this reason the solution to the civil justice "crisis" may
110. Cf. Peck, supra note 27, at 117 (citing derisively to the "near-mystical
reverence of the rulemaking authority exercised by the Judicial Conference").
111. 28 U.S.C. § 472(c)(1) (Supp. II 1990).
112. Id §§ 472(c)(1)(A)-(D).
113. The absence of any mention of criminal cases is striking. See generally S. REP. No. 416, supra note 3 at 1-72, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 680260.
114. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (1988), which provides: "If a defendant is not
brought to trial within the time limit required by section 3161(c) as extended
by section 3161(h), the information or indictment shall be dismissed on motion
of the defendant." See also CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY GROUP OF
THE U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE S. DIST. OF TEX., supra note 1, at 22-25 (discuss-

ing the criminal docket's impact on the civil docket).
115. See Senate Hearings,supra note 90, at 83 (containing written response
of Mr. Patrick Head reflecting lack of research and consideration of impact of
increased criminal cases); id, at 211 (containing statement of Judge Aubrey E.
Robinson, Jr. relating to criminal docket as contributing factor to civil delay).
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lie in reducing criminality and the consequent crushing load of
criminal prosecutions in American courts, rather than the
wholesale reform of civil procedure. The Civil Justice Reform
Act speaks to the burdens of civil litigation on corporations and
middle class Americans, but the legislation says nothing about
the burdens of criminal offenses on the courts and society. The
Act requires civilian advisory groups to seek out the root causes
of cost and delay in civil cases, but it says nothing about a congressional duty to seek out the root causes of criminality and
the backlog of criminal prosecutions.
Although Congress required the advisory groups to conduct
docket assessments, the statute and its legislative history provided the advisory groups with neither normative goals nor guidance for performing the assessments. The Act offered the
district advisory groups no instructions to ensure uniform
docket assessments across all ninety-four district courts.3-1 Instead, the Act simply instructed groups to accomplish this task.
The Act did not indicate what time frame the groups should
use to assess the docket condition nor what baseline period to
provide a comparative measure, nor did the legislation supply
any other parameters to facilitate a statistical docket analysis.
Definitional problems therefore, will plague advisory groups
because the Act and its legislative history simply do not offer
adequate guidance for the tasks the law requires of them. 1 7
The pilot advisory groups also received little direction. After the groups were created, the Federal Judicial Center and
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts supplied
the groups with some materials and advice relating to court statistics,11 8 but the groups were not given any technical guidance
or support for data collection and interpretation. Instead, much
of the technical advice consisted of negative descriptions of im116. At a seminar-workshop for the pilot courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, held August 1-2, 1991, it became apparent that the pilot districts were adopting different methodologies to conduct their docket
assessments, and that there was no agreement among the advisory group
members and their advisors concerning the proper or most appropriate methodology for accomplishing this statutory task. (Author present at this
meeting).
117. In conducting a docket assessment, for example, the advisory groups
have no standards to determine whether the docket condition is "good," "bad,"
or otherwise.
118. See Memorandum to Advisory Groups Appointed Under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (May 29, 1990) (including questionnaires and forms developed by the Southern District of Florida and the Research Division of the
Federal Judicial Center) (on file with the Minnesota Law Review and the
author).
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proper docket assessment methods. 119 Furthermore, some advisory groups, because of the short statutory deadlines for
preparing the reports and plans, had to rely on the statistics the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts and the Federal Judicial Center supplied.1 20 These circumstances severely
constrained, if not compromised, each group's ability to conduct
an independent docket assessment.
As a result, the pilot districts' advisory groups used different methods to assess their dockets. Some performed their own
docket assessments, 121 in others court clerks performed this
task, 122 and in some the advisory groups hired independent consultants to evaluate the dockets. 123 These varying, locally-inspired approaches guaranteed that docket assessments would be
conducted in non-uniform fashion, using different data bases,
assumptions, and social science methodologies. 124 If there were
any intention on Congress's part to develop a national profile of
119. See Examples and Materials Prepared for the Seminar-Workshop for
the Pilot Courts Under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (Kansas City,
Kan., Aug. 1-2, 1991) (Federal Judicial Center) (on file with author and with
the Minnesota Law Review).
120.

Compare CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY GROUP OF THE U.S.

DIsT. COURT FOR THE S. DIST. OF TEX., supra note 1, at 26 (identifying such
statistics in measuring civil docket) and ADVISORY GROUP OF THE U.S. DIST.
COURT FOR THE N. DIST. OF IND., REPORT AND PLAN (Dec. 20, 1991) (relying on
provided court management statistics and interviews) with ADVISORY GROUP
FOR THE U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE S. DIST. OF N.Y., supra note 10, (conducting
extensive survey of practicing attorneys and judges).
121.

See ADVISORY GROUP OF THE U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE N. DIST. OF

CAL., supra note 10, (hoping to obtain funding to engage a consultant); ADvISORY GROUP APPOINTED PURSUANT TO THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF

1990 TO THE U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE DIST. OF DEL., supra note 67 ("The district conducted a survey").
122.

See CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY GROUP OF THE U.S. DIST.

COURT FOR THE S. DIST. OF TEX., supra note 1, at APPENDIX C: REPORT OF THE
CLERK ON THE STATUS OF THE DOCKET FOR THE U.S. DIST. COURT, S. DIST. OF

TEX., (APR. 29, 1991). The clerk's report formed a preliminary assessment of
the docket. A consulting statistician assisted in preparing the final docket assessment which used longer statistical trends. Id. at 26-31.
123. See ADVISORY GROUP APPOINTED PURSUANT TO THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990 TO THE U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE DIST. OF DEL., supra note
67; SOUTHERN DIST. OF N.Y. CIVIL JUSTICE REFORMi ACT ADVISORY GROUP,
supra note 67; CIVIL JUSTICE REFORmi ACT ADVISORY GROUP OF THE U.S. DIST.

COURT FOR THE S. DIST. OF TEX., supra note 1.
124. Compare ADVISORY GROUP APPOINTED PURSUANT TO THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORi ACT OF 1990 TO THE U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE DIST. OF DEL.,

supra note 67, (attorney survey and judicial officer interview) and ADVISORY
GROUP FOR THE U.S. DIST. COURT OF THE DIST. OF WYO., REPORT AND RECOM-

MENDED PLAN (survey and invited testimony) with ADVISORY GROUP OF THE
U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE N. DIST. OF IND., supra note 120 (court management
statistics and interviews).
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the state of the federal docket, the statute's undefined directives to the advisory groups will fail to achieve this goal.125
Similar criticisms may be directed at the other tasks Congress assigned to the local advisory groups. The mandate to
"identify trends in case filings and in the demands being placed
on the court's resources, '126 for example, is likewise openended and ill-defined, and thus leaves the advisory groups in a
methodological lurch. At the most obvious level, the failure to
designate an appropriate baseline leaves advisory groups with
the free-form task of spotting and determining "trends." Congress provided no hints as to whether the advisory groups are
to assess trends solely in the districts, or in comparison with
other districts, or nationwide. Similarly, Congress did not define "demands on the court's resources," raising questions
about the type and severity of the "demands" and the nature of
the "resources."
One can only conclude that the Act's docket-assessment requirement is mere window-dressing. Congress, in requiring the
advisory groups to "identify the principal causes of cost and delay in civil litigation,"'1 27 assumed the very problem it is attempting to identify. Congress did not ask the advisory groups
to determine, through their docket assessment, whether there
actually are problems with cost and delay in the civil justice
system. 128 Rather, the Civil Justice Reform Act simply stated
125. The Report for the Southern District of Texas recommends that the
judicial system consider improved methods of data collection that will assist
advisory groups in their future function of monitoring the district docket. ADVISORY GROUP OF THE U.S. DIsT. COURT FOR THE S. DIsT. OF TEX., supra note
1, at 77. Congress apparently had no such intention to generate a useful and
uniform set of data from the reports written pursuant to the Act.
126. 28 U.S.C. § 472(c)(1)(B) (Supp. II 1990).
127. Id § 472(c)(1)(C).
128. See Senate Hearings,supra note 90, at 37 (statement of Mr. Bill Wagner, using testimony by anecdote); id. at 83 (written response of Mr. Patrick
Head indicating absence of any examination of impact of increased criminal
cases and noting the strain of social security appeals); id. at 227 (statement of
Judge Enslen that Brookings-Biden task force did not spend much time identifying the problem because it already knew what it was); see also House Hearings, supra note 94, at 214 (testimony of Mr. Stuart Gerson relating to
litigation explosion "canards" and that these "myths" ought to be explored);
id. at 394 (memorandum from William M. Hoevler, Chair, National Conference of Federal Trial Judges noting "undocumented premises"); i&i at 407
(joint statement of various New York bar associations in opposition to the
Civil Justice Reform Act, noting "little or no empirical data on the benefits of
the new procedures"); id. at 431 (letter from Judge G. Thomas Eisele, noting
no statistical evidence of failure to process civil caseloads expeditiously and
efficiently).
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that there is a problem with cost and delay and the Act's requirements for reform flow from this assumption.
The task of "identify[ing] the principal causes of cost and
delay in civil litigation" is similarly futile and is virtually impossible for a lay advisory group to accomplish.1 29 Social scientists have studied these problems for years and have produced
competing analyses and conclusions.1 30 Opponents of the Act
repeatedly cited competing studies that refuted Congress's findings relating to crisis in the federal courts.1 31 The citation of
competing studies, however, had little effect in slowing the congressional reform juggernaut. Existing studies, if anything,
teach that conducting empirical research relating to litigation
cost and delay is exceedingly difficult, complex, and time1 32
consuming.
The Federal Judicial Center realized the difficulty of this
particular statutory task and attempted to assist advisory
groups in the pilot and early implementation districts in conducting a survey of civil litigation in the districts. 133 The Judicial Center intended this survey to supply some empirical basis
to allow the advisory groups to assess the principal causes of
cost and delay. The Judicial Center provided the groups with a
129. Unless, of course, Congress was not serious about this endeavor,
either. Arguably, asking the advisory groups to identify the principal causes of
cost and delay was some more window-dressing to support the pre-ordained
procedural reforms that Congress demanded the local district courts
implement.
130. Compare Senate Hearings,supra note 90, at 91-184 (Louis Harris Survey analyzing and documenting major problems of cost and delay in civil litigation; basis for BROOKINGS INST., supra note 41), with TERENCE DuNGWORTH &
NICHOLAS M. PACE, RAND, THE INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE 1990, STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (pointing to the
paucity of empirical data and concluding that the rate of disposition of civil
cases in 1986 was similar to that in 1971).
131. See Senate Hearings,supra note 90, at 35 (letter from Consumer Federation of America stating it did not find data indicating any "relationship between competitiveness and the federal judicial process"); id- at 190 (response
of Mr. Middlebrook indicating lack of data on impact of civil litigation on
American business competitiveness in the global market); see also House Hearing, supra note 94, at 84-85, 101 (testimony of Mr. Bryant relating to lack of
data and contrary Rand study); i& at 115-16 (written statement by Judge Robert F. Peckham referring to contrary Rand study); id at 163 (statement of
Judge Diana Murphy, noting Rand study); id. at 179 (exchange between Rep.
Kasteumeier and Judge Diana E. Murphy on competing statistical analysis in
Rand study); id at 431 (letter from Judge G. Thomas Eisele, citing Rand
study).
132. See, e.g., Hensler, supra note 28; Geyelin, supra note 33.
133. See Memorandum to Advisory Groups Appointed Under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, supra note 118.
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proposed questionnaire and advice on composing a statistically
valid survey sample, thereby transforming pilot advisory groups
into amateur survey-researchers.
Various methodological problems with both the questionnaire and the sampling technique are readily apparent. 13 4 The
deficiencies in this attempted empirical research undermined
the ability of some advisory groups to draw reasonably supportable conclusions concerning the principal reasons for cost and
delay in the district.1 35 At best, these efforts at amateur social
science may have enabled advisory groups to assemble some
raw data and anecdotal commentary concerning the conduct of
civil litigation. But unless and until advisory groups conduct
responsible empirical studies, hard data relating to the "principal causes of cost and delay" will remain elusive.
Undoubtedly it is both premature and unfair to anticipate
wholesale ill-effects of the Civil Justice Reform Act, especially
when conscientious lawyers, judges, and citizens currently are
volunteering hundreds of hours to serve on advisory groups
across the country. It may take years under the new local reform plans to assess whether Congress was wise in requiring
speedy civil justice reform. More immediately, however, there
is something troubling about the haste with which Congress
passed this broad-sweeping reform package and the lack of
meaningful congressional consultation with significant constituencies. For legislation so self-consciously concerned with
"users" of the system, Congress, in its own deliberative
processes, did not consult a sufficiently broad cross-section of
people interested in the problems of judicial administration.
Further, something "insiderish" permeates the Civil Justice Reform Act which contrasts with the democratic rhetoric
extolled in the legislative hearings 136 and congressional reports.137 Despite the rhetoric in the Act's legislative history
about the inclusiveness of the Brookings-Biden task force, business, corporate, and insurance industry litigators were heavily
represented in comparison to other constituencies with inter134. See, e.g., CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY GROUP OF THE U.S.
DIsT. COURT FOR THE S. DIST. OF TEx., supra note 1, at 44 n.62.
135. Id at 46 (advisory group did not have adequate statistical base to draw
conclusions relating to costs of litigation and was unable to draw conclusions
from data to "principal causes of costs").
136. See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 90, at 1-3 (statement of Sen.
Biden); id 29-30 (exchange between Mr. Kimmelman and Sen. Hatch).
137. See S. REP. No. 416, supra note 3, at 3-4, 6-9; reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6805-06, 6808-12.
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ests in the federal courts. 3 8 The subsequent congressional
hearings on the Act were stacked with Brookings-Biden task
force members who had a vested interest in their own work
product and the reform movement. There is nothing democratic about vesting power in an unelected group of elite lawyers who are not responsible to any constituency or elected
official. Significantly, the Brookings-Biden task force had proceeded under predetermined conclusions about crisis in the federal courts, as did the Senate Judiciary subcommittee staff that
drafted the Act.
For years to come, the Act will create a massive, semi-permanent, amateur reform bureaucracy as an adjunct to the federal courts. These advisory groups will now sit, uneasily, along
with the federal judicial-branch rulemaking bodies. Further, as
the analysis above suggests, the legislation is poorly drafted and
ill-defined, and sets implausible (if not impossible) tasks for lay
advisory groups. Viewed cynically, the Civil Justice Reform
Act amounts to a superficial layer of local pluralism that disguises what is essentially congressionally-dictated civil justice
reform.
II. TURF BATTLES: CONGRESSIONAL
CONSIDERATION OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE
REFORM ACT'S CONSTITUTIONAL
AND STATUTORY
UNDERPINNINGS
Writing in 1991 about the negotiations between the Senate
Judiciary Committee and the Judicial Conference concerning
the Civil Justice Reform Act, the Judiciary Committee's staff
director suggested that "[r]egrettably. ... this battle over turf

should not and need not have occurred."' 39 The staff director
saw the "turf battle" as a tempest in a teapot because the judicial branch held a mistaken view of its rulemaking prerogatives
and Congress had the right to perform rulemaking duties when
40
it felt the judiciary was moving too slowly.'

138. See supra notes 42, 90, 95 (discussing participants in the BrookingsBiden task force).
139. Peck, supra note 27, at 114; see also note 31 (quotation from Peck,
supra note 27).
140. Id at 114. The staff director's conclusion was based upon his belief
that the judicial branch was mistaken in its understanding that it had
rulemaking power. In addition, Mr. Peck perceived the legislative process as
allowing the "judiciary a substantial role in shaping the final bill." Id Mr.
Peck's rendition of events is, perhaps, skewed in that the Judicial Conference
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The staff director's self-justifying-but inaccurate-description of the congressional debate over the bill reflects the
lurking turf battle embodied in the separation of powers issue.
This insufficiently developed issue proved to be a fundamentally troubling dimension of the Act. The staff director stated
that:
[m]uch of the debate over the... [Civil Justice Reform Act] centered not on the merits of the underlying proposals, but on the appropriate source of the proposals themselves. Many within the judiciary

framed the debate in this fashion: should the reform proposals encompassed within the... [Act] originate in Congress, or should theyindeed, must they-originate within the judiciary by virtue of the

or, more broadly, because of the doctrine of sepaRules Enabling Act
141
ration of powers.

The Senate Judiciary Committee's staff director's statement disingenuously suggests that much of the debate centered
on the source of congressional authority for the Act. This reflects a distortion of the legislative hearings and the staff negotiations that resulted in the legislation. Actually, little "debate"
took place over the underlying constitutional questions relating
to the respective allocation of rulemaking authority, the separation of powers doctrine, or the general constitutional authority
of Congress to enact the Act. There was also little meaningful
discussion of the Rules Enabling Act and that statute's requirements and limits. In fact, most of the laudatory testimony in
support of the bill centered on the specific merits of the legislative proposals; the parade of reform advocates did not discuss
the rulemaking problems unless prompted to do so. 142 If anything, the opposite of the staff director's assertion is true.
Enamored of the reform movement, the bill's proponents
never paused to question congressional authority to legislate
representatives stated, in successive hearings, that active federal judges had

not been part of the Brookings-Biden task force which had laid the groundwork for the Civil Justice Reform Act, nor had any judicial representative

been consulted by the Senate subcommittee drafting of the bill. The testimony from Judicial Conference representatives suggests, if anything, that the

introduction of the Civil Justice Reform Act took the judicial branch by surprise and that the Judicial Conference scurried to form its judicial subcommittee to analyze and respond to provisions in the legislation. See Senate
Hearings, supra note 90, at 217-18 (prepared statement of Judge Aubrey F.
Robinson Jr.); id. at 329-31 (statement of Judge Robert F. Peckham); House
Hearing,supra note 94, at 121-25 (same). Mr. Peck's remarks are also noteworthy for the suggestion that, as a matter of policy, Congress is justified in
usurping rulemaking power when the judicial branch moves too slowly in effecting rule reform.
141. Peck, supra note 27, at 114.
142. See, e.g., supra note 95 (testimony of favorable witnesses).
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speedily to achieve its identified goals of civil justice reform.
Even the Judicial Conference representatives, the bill's most
vocal opponents, who had expressed grave reservations about
the constitutionality of congressional authority to pass the legproviislation, devoted the bulk of their testimony to specific
43
sions pertaining to particular procedural reforms.
Ultimately, the Civil Justice Reform Act is crucially important because of the way it reallocates the rulemaking function
from the judiciary to Congress, a reallocation that is likely to
have continuing consequences. The paucity of considered debate surrounding this congressional usurpation of authority is
significant in itself. Perhaps symptomatic of legislative hearings in general, the hearings on the Civil Justice Reform Act
did not provide a forum for close examination of the fundamental constitutional questions relating to the bill, the Rules Enabling Act, or the separation of powers problems inherent in
the legislation.
As will be seen, various bill proponents did not raise the
statutory and constitutional issues and, when questioned about
rulemaking authority, offered superficial, muddled answers.
The Judicial Conference representatives hesitantly but repeatedly suggested the statutory and constitutional issues relating
to the bill, but they did not press their points. Similarly, a Justice Department representative also flagged potential constitutional problems while maintaining the executive branch's
commitment to the doctrine of separation of powers, but he
lamely raised and inadequately pursued the constitutional question. American Bar Association witnesses noted a split in their
ranks on the constitutional questions and expressed some
doubts about Congress's rulemaking authority, but ultimately
this organization's representatives did not press the issues
either. Therefore, in view of these tepid challenges, the Senate
subcommittee simply asserted congressional rulemaking authority based not on reasoned legal theory but on legislative
fiat.
A.

THE LEGISLATION'S PROPONENTS

The Senate and House held three days of hearings on revised versions of the Civil Justice Reform Act. 4 4 These hearings reflected sparse discussion of the fundamental statutory
143. See Senate Hearings,supra note 90, at 208-25, 314-60 (testimony of Judicial Conference representatives).
144. See id at 2, 307; House Hearing,supra note 94, at 1.
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and constitutional questions surrounding the Act, especially
from the sponsors and proponents of the bill. Two examples illustrate the low level of discussion and concern. On the first
day of hearings, Senator Orrin Hatch broached the separation
of powers issues only in the most generalized terms:
The rationale of the doctrine of separation of powers counsels the
legislative branch to be extremely cautious when it considers intrusions into the other two branches. And I dare say that Federal judges
who review the meaning of many of the laws we enact probably have
several detailed and choice ideas on how we can better conduct our
business. I am equally confident that the Congress would not look too
kindly on having the judiciary's ideas imposed on us. As a matter of
fact, we have not looked very kindly on some of their ideas from time
to time, both conservatives and liberals, believe it or not.1 45

Obviously, this rhetorical statement does little to elucidate
the statutory and constitutional problems implicated in the
Civil Justice Reform Act. An even more telling colloquy occurred between Senator Biden, chair of the Senate Judiciary
Committee and the bill's sponsor, and Mr. Patrick Head, Vice
14 6
President and General Counsel of the FMC Corporation.
Mr. Head was a member of Senator Biden's Brookings task
force who testified in support of the Act.147 At the conclusion
of Mr. Head's testimony, Senator Biden posed the separation of
powers question concerning the rulemaking authority of the respective branches. Mr. Head's muddled response anticipated the
general, superficial, confused consideration Congress afforded
the entire issue of the proposed statute's constitutional
underpinnings.
THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Head, would you be willing to speak for a

moment to this separation of powers issue? Do you see any conflict?
Mr. HEAD: I don't really. This is essentially a procedural system.
This is not a substantive system. I was impressed, again, when Chief
Judges [Robert F.] Peckham and [Carl B.] Reaben [sic] attended because the chief judge of a district does not have any power today. The
chief judge can't move a case. We can't go to the chief judge and say
this judge is sitting on this motion now for 10 months, do something
about it. They can't do that.
This system would allow a lot more activity in the district than
can happen today, and it is of a procedural nature. None of these get
into the substance of a case, but there [sic] impingement on the actual
145. Senate Hearings, supra note 90, at 5. Senator Hatch returned to the
hearings at various junctures to express his deep skepticism about the legislation. See, e.g., House Hearing,supra note 94, at 585-86 (containing additional
views of Mr. Hatch).
146. See Senate Hearings, supra note 90, at 8-9, 54-58 (testimony of Mr.
Patrick Head).
147. Id. at 10.
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result in a case by some of these procedures. And I believe in the
long run the Federal judges will welcome this when they take a close
look at it, as did Judges Peckham and Reuben in that 4-hour session.
THE CHAIPMAN: Would anyone else like to comment on that

issue?
[NO RESPONSE].

148

With all due respect, Mr. Head's response did not address
the import of Senator Biden's question. Therefore, ironically,
Mr. Head's answer nicely made the case for the judiciary's
rulemaking authority over the procedural reforms that Congress usurped for itself in the Act. Apparently there was no
fooling Mr. Head: he knew a package of procedural reforms
when he saw them. If it is true, as he twice asserted, that the
Act proposed a procedural system rather than a substantive
system, then that division describes the rulemaking allocation
of the Rules Enabling Act: procedural rulemaking belongs to
the judicial branch, substantive lawmaking to the legislative.
In quite innocently getting it wrong for the legislative subcommittee, Senator Biden's witness actually got it right for the
judiciary.
Senator Hatch's statement and the exchange between Senator Biden and Mr. Head constitute the entire discussion by the
bill's proponents of the separation of powers issue. Senator
Biden did include, as part of the written legislative record, a
conclusory staff memorandum asserting that Congress pos49
sessed exclusive power to enact the Civil Justice Reform Act.
During the hearing's remaining three days, Judicial Conference
representatives, witnesses from various judicial organizations,
the American Bar Association, and the Justice Department
raised statutory and constitutional arguments pertaining to the
Rules Enabling Act and separation of powers issues, but the
Senate paid little heed.

B. THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
Representatives of the Judicial Conference of the United
States Courts 50 appeared three times to oppose enactment of
148. Id- at 58.
149. Senator Biden requested that a memorandum prepared by his staff,
summarizing the constitutional questions, be entered in the record "for the
benefit or the criticism of my colleagues who will read the record." Id. at 59.
The Memorandum to Senator Biden concerning the Civil Justice Reform Act
appears in the Senate Hearings. Id- at 60-75.
150. See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (Supp. II 1990) (defining the membership and functions of the Judicial Conference).
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the Civil Justice Reform Act, to raise statutory and constitutional issues concerning Congress's authority to promulgate the
legislation, and to recommend modifications of various technical provisions. 151 Perhaps because of the awkwardness of the
judiciary's taking a definitive position on the legislation's constitutionality in advance of its enactment, the Judicial Conference did not press its case concerning the possible problematic
bases of the Act. Indeed, the Conference raised its concerns in
vague terms and instead focused on persuading the Senate subcommittee to modify, amend, or eliminate specific provisions in
the Act. Although the Senate subcommittee ultimately incorporated many of the Conference's recommendations with rethe Conference's
gard to specific provisions, 152 it rejected
53
statutory and constitutional concerns.
The speed with which the Senate Judiciary Committee
drafted and proposed the legislation caught the Judicial Conference unaware of, and unprepared for, the Civil Justice Reform
Act.35 4 The Conference hurriedly set up a subcommittee to
study, analyze, and respond to the legislation. However, by the
first legislative hearing on March 6, 1990, the Conference had
only partially formed its response. Indeed, the Judicial Conference's initial problem in responding to the bill was that it did
not meet until March 13, 1990, a week after the first legislative
hearing. 55 The Conference hastily impressed Judge Aubrey E.
Robinson Jr., Chief Judge of the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia, into service to present the Conference's opposition to the proposed bill.
The Conference fundamentally objected to the Act as an
unprecedented congressional intrusion into judicial rulemaking
prerogatives. Although asserting this objection only generally
at the first hearing, the Conference further elaborated its position in written testimony at successive hearings. 56 For the
judges, the Rules Enabling Act transgression was apparent and
troubling. During the first day's testimony, Judge Robinson
151. See Peck, supra note 27, at 117. But see supra note 140 (criticizing Mr.
Peck's rendition of events).
152. See supra note 94 (identifying the three hearings).
153. See S. REP. No. 416, supra note 3, at 9-13, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6811-6816.
154. See Senate Hearings,supra note 90, at 329 (statement by Judge Robert
F. Peckham describing the evolution of the Judiciary's position on the proposed Title I of S. 2648 (Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plans)).
155. Id. at 329-30.
156. Id. at 333-35; House Hearings,supra note 94, at 125-27.
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perceptively pursued the inapt answer supplied in Mr. Head's
57
earlier testimony in response to Senator Biden's question:
There is inherent in this also the suggestion that conceding, as
some of your former persons who testified this morning did, that this
is basically a procedural matter that the bill is dealing with. Why
then, why then, we ask, should the congressionally mandated rules
enabling act be bypassed?' s

Judge Robinson's rhetorical question is similar to the brief
but pointed challenge in his written submission to the Senate
subcommittee on behalf of the Judicial Conference:
In addition, there has been a strong reaction that the bill is extraordinarily intrusive into the internal workings of the Judicial
Branch. These are procedural matters which should be handled
through the normal, Congressionally-mandated Rules Enabling Act
process. Many thoughtful Federal judges are very, very uneasy about
the signals this bill sends of legislative incursion-albeit well-mean159
ing-in the judicial arena and what it portends for the future.
157. See supra text accompanying note 148.
158. See Senate Hearings,supra note 90, at 212 (statement of Judge Aubrey
E. Robinson, Jr.). Judge Robinson's testimony also set forth the concern of
the Judicial Conference with the unusual method Congress employed to confer upon itself the rulemaking function:
Then, of course, it has been alluded to, there is a concern about
the extent to which this is at least perceived in its initial phase as being intrusive into the internal workings of the judiciary. We recognize our place. You know, we know that there are certain rules and
regulations, et cetera, that we have to abide by. But by the same token, there is the perception when, as has been indicated, that we
shall, we shall, we shall, and it goes on what we shall do, that this is
getting into micromanagement, even though there is the appearance
that you are going to do it with the advice and consent of advisory
committees.
Id at 212 (referring to the mandatory requirements the Civil Justice Reform
Acts places upon the federal courts through the advisory groups).
159. Id at 221 (prepared statement of Judge Aubrey E. Robinson, Jr. on
behalf of the Judicial Conference). Judge Robinson's written responses to
questions submitted by members of the Judiciary subcommittee were equally
brief on the separation of powers problems inherent in the bill. See id at 28990. Judge Robinson's written answers also expressed concern over the short
time that the Civil Justice Reform Act provided for promulgating plans in the
pilot and early implementation districts. Id. The suggestion was that this
short time period would violate Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83, which requires public notice and comment periods for new local rules. See id. Judge
Robinson wrote:
The appropriateness of both the Congressional mandate and the
period for implementation are questionable. First, it would be far
more appropriate to follow the Rules Enabling Act process provided
by Congress. Second, twelve months is an insufficient period of time
to implement a mandatory plan as proposed by the bill. The bill contemplates a great deal of input from the bar and public but it does not
provide enough time to allow effective participation by these groups.
In many cases a complete revision of local rules and practices would
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Between March and June 1990, the Judicial Conference,
through its subcommittee on the Civil Justice Reform Act, regrouped and strengthened its statutory and constitutional arguments against the legislation. 160 Senator Biden, cognizant of
the increasingly strained relations between the judicial branch
and his subcommittee concerning the Act, opened the second
day of hearings in June by chiding the judiciary for its churlish
stance on the bill.161 His opening remarks capture the flavor of
the ensuing debate between the two branches over the Act:
162
that of two co-equal branches talking past one another.
Senator Biden simply refused to acknowledge the importance of the judiciary's overriding concern with the proper allocation of rulemaking authority, and its future consequences.
Instead, he cast the judiciary as the implacable enemy, waging
inflammatory rhetorical warfare, unappeased by legislative
compromises on specific substantive provisions of the legislation.163 The Judicial Conference, meanwhile, continued to raise
be required and such revisions are normally accomplished after much
effort and a longer period of time than provided for in the bill....
It is clearly appropriate for each district court to have a specific
civil case management plan. It is our unequivocal belief that if such a
plan is to be a requirement, it is best for the Judicial Conference to
formulate and impose the requirement.
Id.at 289-90.
160. See id. at 330-33; House Hearing,supra note 94, at 121-25.
161. Senator Biden stated:
Unfortunately, despite my best efforts and the work of my staff
night and day for more than 5 months in negotiating with the task
force that the Chief Justice specifically designated to work with us,
we will hear today that the Judicial Conference, quote "disfavors the
bill."
Given the overwrought response that greeted the legislation initially, I do not find the Conference's position surprising. Of course, I
had hoped that by modifying the substance of the bill to meet many,
many of the concerns of the Conference, I might persuade them to reexamine their rhetoric.
Regrettably, it now appears that the Conference's objections remain, regardless of the changes in the substance of the bill. I know
that we will hear today that there are remaining objections to the bill
which will be used to justify the Conference's "disfavor." I think it is
time to lay these arguments to rest as well.
Senate Hearings,supra note 90, at 309-10.
3.62. Id. at 307-11.
163. See id at 310. Senator Biden, criticizing the judiciary for using exaggerated rhetoric in its objections, stated:
First, some argue that even though the ideas in the bill are worthy of support on the merits, it is inappropriate for Congress to be legislating them because procedural reform is within the exclusive
province of the judiciary. This argument is often cloaked in terms of
separation of power.
As a matter of constitutional law, the argument is without merit.
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its statutory and constitutional concerns, all the while negotiating for the least intrusive civil justice reform. If it could not
win the constitutional rulemaking war, the Conference was determined at least to mitigate the substantive rulemaking
damage.
Between the March and June hearings, the Judicial Conference continued to consider the legislation, to present its objections to the Senate subcommittee staff, and to offer its own
alternative fourteen-point program for reform.' 64 During this
period, however, the Senate subcommittee refused to abandon
its legislation.1 6 5 When Judge Peckham appeared to testify in
June, he again asserted the Conference's two objections: that
the Conference's fourteen-point program was a superior way to
achieve civil justice reform, and that the Civil Justice Reform
166
Act violated the letter and spirit of the Rules Enabling Act.
As the Supreme Court said nearly 50 years ago, quote, "Congress has
undoubted power to regulate the practice and procedures of the Federal courts," end of quote.
As a policy matter, the separation of powers argument fairs little
better. The users of the Federal court system have no means other
than through their democratically-elected representatives to express
their dissatisfaction with the civil justice system and to demand reform for that system. For too long, we have ignored these cries for
change, and this bill finally-and properly, in my view-acts upon
their desires.
164. See i&i at 330-31 (statement of Judge Robert F. Peckham, on behalf of
the Judicial Conference). Judge Peckham indicated that the Conference continued to have two basic concerns:
(1) responsibility for the kinds of procedural matters covered by S.
2027 should remain in the judiciary, and (2) the most constructive
course was not to superimpose nationally one uniform and unproven
new system, but to ask each district to assess its own needs and to tailor appropriate responses to them, while simultaneously committing
the Judicial Conference to conducting, in a limited number of volunteer courts, carefully designed experiments that would assess the effectiveness of a range of different approaches.
Id at 330.
165. Id at 331.
166. See id at 316-17 (statement of Judge Robert F. Peckham, on behalf of
the Judicial Conference). Judge Peckham stated:
[T]he executive committee fears that the statute would circumvent the procedures established and recently reendorsed by Congress
in the Rules Enabling Act, and set a precedent for unwise departures
from the rulemaking process.
We feel that there is a great balance in the provisions of the
Rules Enabling Act, that it took 10 years in gestation from 1924 to
1934. And as I indicated, it has been revisited and recently reendorsed. It allows deliberative process at the beginning. It allows comment from judges and scholars and lawyers.
But in the end, of course, the ultimate power is with the Con-
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The Judicial Conference's June presentation was tactically
interesting. The Conference stressed that Congress itself had
only two years earlier revised and strengthened the Rules Enabling Act to require a more open process in judicial rulemaking. 6 7 Congress had, therefore, recognized and reaffirmed the
basic allocation of procedural rulemaking authority to the judicial branch. In addition, the Conference acknowledged that
Congress has the power to veto such procedural rules that originate in the third branch, a nod to Congress's democratic,
majoritarian function. Perhaps sensing Senator Biden's pique
at the Conference's lack of enthusiasm for the bill, the Conference paid due deference to the coordinate legislative branch.
gress, as it should be in a democratic society, to accept the rule, to reject the rule, or to modify the rule, and judges feel very strongly
about that, particularly when it relates to procedural matters that go
to the core of the performance of their judicial function. And I think
that that more than anything else lies at the root of the response of
the executive committee and the Conference to the legislation in this
way....
Id.
167. See generally Judicial Improvements Act and Access to Justice Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, tit. IV, 102 Stat. 4642, 4648-52 (1988) (amending
Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-2074 (1988)). In making this point, the
Judicial Conference could not resist the temptation to point out that while
Congress had two years earlier required a more open process and participation
in the judicial rulemaking arena, the Senate subcommittee had drafted the
Civil Justice Reform Act with even less consultation than Congress required
of third-branch rulemaking.
We fear that enactment of this statute could result in real harm
to the rule-making process that has served both Congress and the
courts so well for so long. As you fully appreciate, Congress recently
reviewed and re-codified that process, taking care to build into it procedures that assure that before nationally applicable rules of procedure are imposed they are considered most deliberately by thoughtful
and experienced judges, lawyers, and law professors over a substantial
period of time, and that the lawyers and litigants into whose world
the new rules would intrude are given ample opportunity to articulate
their reactions, point out potential problems, and add suggestions. As
we who have sat on the bench for some time have discovered, sometimes painfully, procedural matters are extraordinarily complex.
They can not only influence, but fix, the outcome of litigation. New
rules can have a great many unforeseen consequences. And it takes
the most considered deliberation to be sure that the dynamic between
new programs and established practices is constructive. Thus it is crucial that inputs from all affected quarters be sought before procedural
change is imposed. For reasons we do not understand, Title I of S.
2648 has not been drafted through such a process. Thus one of the
primary bases for our opposition to the statute is our belief that nationally applicable procedural norms should be imposed only through
that rule-making process.
Senate Hearings, supra note 90, at 333-44 (statement of Judge Robert F.
Peckham, on behalf of the Judicial Conference).
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Most striking, however, the Conference tip-toed around the
separation of powers problem. In its June statement submitted
to the Senate Judiciary subcommittee, the Conference delicately raised the issue without marshalling constitutional, statutory, or doctrinal arguments to defend its position. 68 The
strongest objections the Conference raised at the June 1990
hearing were reduced to two highly generalized points: first,
"[t]he legislation would represent unwise legislative intrusion
into procedural matters that are properly the province of the
judiciary"; and second "[t]he statute would circumvent the procedures established and recently re-endorsed by Congress in
the Rules Enabling Act."1 69
The Judicial Conference did little to shore up its opposition
to the Act between the Senate hearings in June and the House
hearing in September. Indeed, the Conference submitted the
statement prepared for the Senate to the House subcommittee
record. 170 In addition, Judge Peckham simply renewed the
Conference's vague, generalized statutory and constitutional opposition to the bill during his appearance before the House
subcommittee. 71 '
At the House hearing, Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier, the subcommittee chairman, made one last attempt
168.

The Judicial Conference stated:
Some thoughtful judges also have suggested that when Congress
considers enactment of legislation that covers the kinds of procedural
matters that are at the core of the judicial function, it ventures into
areas of constitutional sensitivity. Rather than explore the constitutional arguments that are raised by this suggestion, we wish to emphasize our view that simply as a matter of wisdom of policy it would
not be sensible to pass legislation that could deprive judges of the discretion they need to determine in individual cases how best to use
procedural tools to reduce delay and litigant expense.
Id at 334-35.
169. Id at 348 (statement of Judge Robert F. Peckham, on behalf of the
Judicial Conference). The Judicial Conference also noted that it was "presently implementing a program which will accomplish the purposes of Title I of
S.2648" and argued that the bill would "tend to defeat the aims of cost and
delay reduction." Id- at 348.
170. There are only slight differences between the statements submitted to
the Senate and House. Compare House Hearing,supra note 94, at 109-44 with
Senate Hearings,supra note 90, at 319-48.
171. Judge Peckham stated:
Now, a second reason why the Judicial Conference does not endorse S.2648 is our concern that the legislation will circumvent the
procedures established and recently reendorsed by Congress in the
rules enabling act and set a precedent for unwise departures from the
rulemaking process. We feel that the provisions of the rules enabling
act bring a proper balance between the roles of Congress and the judiciary. It is a deliberative process that begins by allowing the appropri-
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to clarify the respective rulemaking roles of Congress and the
judiciary. Judge Peckham maintained that the judiciary has
authority over procedural rulemaking:
Mr. KASTENMEIER. The primary basis, it appears, for your opposition to the act as a general proposition is that, as you state, nationally
applicable procedural norms should be imposed only through, really,
the Judicial Conference rulemaking process, rather than legislating
court procedures. But aren't there times when it indeed is appropriate for the Congress to legislate court procedures? One case that
comes to mind is the mass torts area where the judiciary has in fact
supported a legislation process by this committee streamlining the
procedures for the consolidation of mass accident cases. Wouldn't
that be an exception?
Judge PEcKHAM. That relates to the jurisdiction of Federal
courts, and we are not contending that through the rulemaking process we can grant jurisdiction, so I would make that distinction.
I think we are talking about purely procedural matters that go to
the heart of how a judge conducts his business. That it is most important that the judges have an opportunity to discuss those changes so
that they can be harmonized with the entire body of procedural rule.
And, as I indicated and as we all know, the process ends in Congress
where the ultimate power is.1 7 2

While this congressional testimony demonstrates the low
level of public debate on major legislation, the Judicial Conference's critique of the Civil Justice Reform Act and the Senate's
reply suggest the tension between the two branches concerning
power and prerogative. Congress's stance, counterpoised with
the Judicial Conference's delicate replies, highlight a portrait of
separation of powers problems between these two branches. In
these exchanges, the legislature and the judiciary do not appear
as co-equal branches. Rather, the Conference's testimony was
nothing more than a highly deferential minuet with the branch
that defines federal court jurisdiction and that can, if it desires,
17 3
abolish the lower federal courts altogether.
ate advisory committee to propose rules and receive comments from
judges, scholars, and lawyers concerning proposed rules.
In the end, the ultimate power is with the Congress to accept, reject, or modify the rule. Judges feel very strongly about judicial involvement in the process, particularly when the subject relates to
procedural matters that go to the core of the performance of the judicial function.
I think that as much as anything the bypassing of the rulemaking
process lies at the root of the intensely negative response of most Federal judges to the original version of this legislation.
House Hearing,supra note 94, at 105-06.
172. Id. at 177.
173. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 9 (granting Congress the power "[to constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court.").
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THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

The Justice Department wavered in its support of the Civil
Justice Reform Act.1 7 4 In so doing, it drew Representative Kastenmeier's ire for opposing portions of the parallel Federal
Courts Study Committee Implementation legislation. 75
Although the Department supported the "tenor" of the Act and
its broad reforms, its representative expressed concern with the
17 6
same constitutional issues raised by the Judicial Conference.
In this instance, however, the executive branch seemed somewhat more sensitive to the judicial branch's prerogatives than
to the legislature's. The Justice Department specifically identified a separation of powers problem if only to make the additional point that the doctrine required the executive branch to
177
defer to the superior legal interpretation of the judiciary.
The Justice Department's written statement repeated its
polite questioning of the Act's constitutional basis.'7 8 Stuart
Gerson, the Department's representative, testified that the major problem with the Civil Justice Reform Act was "manda174. See House Hearing,supra note 94, at 182-214 (testimony and prepared
statement of Stuart Gerson, Assistant Att'y Gen., Civil Div., U.S. Dep't of

Justice).
175. Id at 211.
176. See infra note 178 (quoting Mr. Gerson).
177. Some of the things we have had to say relating to imposing management systems upon the judiciary I think have been adequately and
exemplarily covered by Judge Peckham, who I think has it about
right on the constitutional basis, and we largely defer because of our
concerns about separation of powers to what the judiciary has to say
about the management of the judiciary. I think Judge Peckham had
it exactly right when he answered the chairman with respect to the
difference between management controls and jurisdictional perimeters. Hence, as the chairman is aware, we greatly support the proposal with respect to the consolidation of multiparty, multidistrict mass
tort cases. That is a jurisdictional matter. We think it is appropriate.... And that is the reason we can support it while we oppose on
separation of powers grounds the mandation of certain management
controls upon the Federal district and courts of appeals, though we
think they are a pretty good idea, and that with the participation of
the Judicial Conference and others they will be adopted at least in
spirit and probably in significant detail.
House Hearing,supra note 94, at 183 (testimony of Mr. Gerson).
178. See idc at 187-210. The written statement applied also to H.R. 5381, the
Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990. Ia at 187.
Again, the written statement suggested possible constitutional problems only
in generalized terms:
As I describe the Department's views on these important pieces
of legislation, and renew our commitment to working with the Judiciary and the Congress on judicial reform legislation, I must reiterate
an important Administration policy. We are guided by a healthy respect for the Constitution's separation of powers. This respect leads
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tion." Mr. Gerson stated, "We are in favor of many of those
things. Some of them constitutionally can be mandated. Some
of them can't, and I think where we have objection, it is in that.
It is of constitutional concern."'1 79 Finally, Representative Kastenmeier directly raised the constitutional issue:
Mr. KASTENMEIER. Do you think there are constitutional concerns with the original bill?
180
Mr. [STUART] GERSON. Yes.

Similar to the Judicial Conference, the Justice Department
raised the constitutional separation of powers issue but neither
developed the argument nor pursued the point. During three
days of hearings and open record, only the American Bar Association made an attempt to supply some content to the constitutional objection to the Civil Justice Reform Act.
D.

THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION

During spring 1990, the American Bar Association formed
us to refrain from commenting on a number of provisions in these
bills that we regard as internal and native to the Judicial Branch....
We similarly believe that it is unwise to impose detailed statutory
controls on the internal operations of the Judicial Branch in the exercise of its constitutional authority. Congress, however, may wish to
adopt measures that facilitate the exercise of that authority by extending to the courts additional tools or resources with which to improve the administration of justice.
Id. at 188-89.
179. I& at 213 (responding to Rep. Kastenmeier's question whether the
Justice Department was supporting the Biden bill, the Civil Justice Reform
Act). Mr. Gerson's response is interesting because it reiterates the constitutional objection:
We are in accord with much that is stated in that bill, as it has
been improved and now exists, and I have covered many of those
things in the written testimony. We very much subscribe to its tenor.
Our trouble is with mandation. For example, we support the idea of
the district plan. We think it is good, and that it would be beneficial
to have nationwide uniformity. There ought to be deference to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We think that the district courts
ought to have a central advisory group to deal with such issues. We
are in favor of case-tracking systems. The Attorney General has testified in favor of them before the Federal Courts Study Committee.
... We don't think that the legislature can manage the cases and
dockets of the Federal district courts directly. We think that they do
a great deal in defining their jurisdiction, in defining venue, in defining the rules under which cases are decided, but we think also that
most of the ideas that are incorporated in that bill are laudable. Some
of them ought to be modified.
Id. at 213 (omitted portions quoted in text).
180. 1& at 213. That was the end of the colloquy. Mr. Gerson did not elaborate further on the Justice Department's views on the constitutional
problems with the bill.
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a "Civil Justice Coordinating Committee" to study and analyze
the Civil Justice Reform Act in order to recommend to the
ABA Board of Governors what portions of the Act to support
or oppose.18 1 The committee's memorandum to the ABA Board
of Governors, incorporated into the Senate record, reflected the
committee's discussion of and division over the statutory and
constitutional authority of Congress to implement the
182
legislation.
In this memorandum, the ABA supplied the only doctrinal
support in the record for the theory that the Act was a questionable assertion of congressional legislative rulemaking
power. 183 While no ABA representatives appeared during the
spring Senate hearings, they appeared in September 1990 to testify before the House subcommittee considering the Act and
181. See Memorandum from The Civil Justice Coordinating Committee to
the Board of Governors of the American Bar Association (June 9, 1990), reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note 90, at 481-91 [hereinafter ABA
Memorandum].
182. There were, however, two broader constitutional and philosophical issues where there was no solid consensus of our Committee.
Rather than deciding them by narrow margins, or identifying which
individual members held a particular view, we thought it would be
more helpful to the Board in its deliberations to simply acknowledge
them ....

The first issue was the constitutional, or philosophical,

question of whether Congress can, or should, pass legislation that
mandates a particular form of case management, or should instead
leave details of case management to the discretion of the courts
within the framework of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On
this issue a majority of the Committee did not believe that we could
determine whether the revised bill was constitutional or unconstitutional on its face. While several members were firm in their views on
each side of the question, a majority concluded the issue was too complex for easy resolution given the time constraints for our deliberations. All recognize, however, that legislation mandating procedures
implicates separation of power[s] concerns.
Id at 483-84.
The second issue raised by the ABA was whether it should oppose the legislation if Congress did not make the language modifications, intended to address the separation of powers problem, suggested in Part III of the ABA's
memorandum. See id. at 488-89.
183. We recognize that for the Congress to express its concern and to
require the development of cost and delay reduction plans is appropriate. However, while it is within the power and province of the Congress to enact rules and proscribe jurisdiction of the federal courts, to
dictate to the courts how they should conduct their internal business-as distinguished from establishing rules of procedure-implicates the separation of powers doctrine.... Moreover, sound public
policy suggests that the rule-making process should be in accordance
with the Rules Enabling Act.
Id. at 489 (citations omitted).
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the Federal Courts Study Implementation legislation. 184 At
this hearing, the ABA renewed its constitutional objections to
the Act by stating the separation of powers problem and argurulemaking authority delineing that Congress overstepped its
85
ated in the Rules Enabling Act.
E.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE LEGISLATIVE TESTIMONY

Congressional discussion of the statutory and constitutional
issues relating to the Civil Justice Reform Act was embarrassingly superficial, ill-informed, and trivial. It is sobering to realize that almost everyone who testified before the Senate and
House subcommittees was a lawyer or judge, that the staffers
who drafted the legislation were lawyers, and that the chief
184. See House Hearing,supra note 94, at 241-47 (statement of Robert Landis, Former Chair, ABA Standing Committee on Federal Judicial Improvements, and statement of George C. Freeman, Jr., Chair, ABA Business Law
Section).
185. Id. at 266-70 (prepared statement of George C. Freeman, Jr., on behalf
of the ABA). Mr. Freeman stated:
Public policy suggests that the rule-making process should be carried
out in accordance with the Rules Enabling Act. The orderly process
established by the Act, which has functioned extraordinarily well,
leaves the details of case management to the discretion of the courts,
within the framework of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Id at 267.
The exchange between Representative Kastenmeier and Mr. Freeman revealed that the ABA committee was prompted by its member judges to consider further the separation of powers problem.
Mr. KASTENMEIER. Mr. Gerson suggested that there could be constitutional problems with the original concept presented. We do not
know that legislation regulating procedures by which cases are litigated in the Federal courts have survived a constitutional challenge in
the courts. Why do you think that legislation regulating the procedures by which cases are scheduled for litigation in the courts
presents more serious problems, more serious separation of powers
problems than this?
Mr. FREEMAN. Well, I will explain that, sir. In the ABA when
we found ourselves at odds over this, the president of the ABA appointed an eight-person committee, and for some strange reason he
made me the chairman of it. I suddenly found that I was one of the
four practicing lawyers of that committee and the other four members were sitting judges. At our initial meetings I think I observed,
not having done my homework, that at least we don't have a constitutional problem here. The judges took me to task, and I said, "Well,
why don't you all send us cases which you think raise these concerns?" They do, and they are cited in my testimony. And I will simply in a sentence or two explain their relevance and why I think there
is a question. I don't think that these cases are dispositive, but they
urge caution.
Id. at 282 (subsequent description of cases omitted).
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congressional sponsors were lawyers. Surely they all knew
better.
The Act's record demonstrates the debasement of public
policy discourse at the national level. The Act is a major piece
of legislation mandating massive procedural reform throughout
the entire United States, but its legislative hearings reflect a
paucity of considered reflection on its impact and on congressional authority to order such reform. What the legislative record does reflect is the single-minded determination of Senator
Biden, his Senate subcommittee, and his staff to enact this legislation, despite repeated (albeit half-hearted) statutory and
constitutional challenges from the other two branches of government and the leading organization of American lawyers.
The record also reflects little efficient opposition to the
Act. The Judicial Conference, the Justice Department, and the
American Bar Association weakly asserted and poorly developed their statutory and constitutional challenges. Other witnesses, most notably federal judges testifying individually or on
behalf of various judicial organizations, appeared at the Senate
and House subcommittee hearings to raise questions about the
Act's constitutional basis.'8 6 These individuals, however,
merely suggested that the Act constituted an unusual incursion
87
into third branch affairs'
Typically, the federal judges appeared shy about developing an extended constitutional argument that opposed the bill.
Because the judges may someday be called upon to construe the
Act's constitutionality, 8 the Act raised the specter of the federal judiciary offering Congress an advisory opinion on legislation affecting judicial branch affairs. Apart from the statutory
and constitutional questions relating to the allocation of
rulemaking authority, the Act's legislative hearings highlight
the general problems that the judicial branch faces when testifying on pending legislation. 8 9
186.

See id. at iii (listing witnesses); Senate Hearings, supra note 90, at iii

(same).
187. See supra note 94 (witnesses testifying in the Senate Hearings).
188. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (construing
constitutionality of the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines).
189. See, e.g., Court Reform and Access to Justice Act Hearings,supra note
97, at 3-52 (testimony and prepared statement of Judge Elmo B. Hunter, Committee on Court Administration, Judicial Conference of the United States); id.
at 312 (testimony and prepared statement of Judge Abner J. Mikva); id. at 312
(testimony and prepared statement of Judge Patrick Higginbotham); id. 901-82
(letters from various judges); see also The Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 1989. Hearing on H.R. 3406 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intel-
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The American Bar Association arguably supplied the most
thoughtful presentation of the constitutional problems relating
to the bill, but even its analysis was thin and tentative. When
the legislative record for the Civil Justice Reform Act closed
during fall 1990, there was very little explication either of the
Rules Enabling Act limitations or the separation of powers arguments as they related to the ability of Congress to enact the
bill. Congress passed the Act on this weak record and the official legislative history asserted the exclusive rulemaking authority of Congress enact this law.190
III.

SENATE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR EXCLUSIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO ENACT
THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF
1990

The Senate repeated its justification for Congress's statutory and constitutional authority to enact the Civil Justice Reform Act in three different sources: a Senate Judiciary
subcommittee staff memorandum to Senator Biden which was
included in the first Senate hearing record, 19 1 the official Senate Report accompanying the final bill,192 and a subsequent law
review commentary by the staff director for the Senate Judiciary subcommittee. 19 3 These sources contain essentially the
same broad arguments to justify the Act-one based in statutory and constitutional law, the other on public policy.
The Senate's basic position is that Congress, as a matter of
statutory and constitutional law, has exclusive rulemaking authority. As a policy matter, Congress asserted that it has the
ability, if not the duty, to act when the judicial branch is not
moving quickly enough to achieve civil justice reform. Despite
the simple structure of these arguments, the Senate's official
report attacked the Judicial Conference's objection based on
the Rules Enabling Act as an argument "cloaked in separation
lectual Property,and the Administrationof Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary,101st Cong., 1st Sess. 17-20 (prepared statement of Judge William
W. Schwarzer representing the Judicial Conference of the United States).
190. S. REP. No. 416, supra note 3, at 10-11, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6813.
191. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
192. S. REP. No. 416, supra note 3, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802.
"The House bill was passed in lieu of the Senate bill after amending its language to contain much of the text of the Senate bill." 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6802.
193. Peck, supra note 27, at 114-17.
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of powers terms. ' 194 The fact that the Senate repeated this derogatory characterization in the official Senate Report indicates
the dismissive treatment afforded this argument in the legislative hearings and in the final committee report.195 Alternatively, the Senate's repeated negative characterization of the
Judicial Conference's objection may reveal the powerful challenge that the separation of powers argument presented to
Congress.
This Part sets out the Senate's view of the allocation of
rulemaking authority and provides the basis for a critical examination of Congress's arguments.1 96 It argues that the Senate's
position consists of selective quotations from case precedent,
distorted statutory construction, and argumentative non sequiturs. This Part ultimately assesses whether Congress reasonably concluded that the separation of powers argument
regarding rulemaking was a diversionary argument without
merit, and that the Rules Enabling Act prohibited the judiciary
from promulgating civil justice reform through its own
rulemaking powers.

A.

THE SENATE VERSION OF THE ALLOCATION OF

RULEMAKING AUTHORITY

The Senate's position relating to its rulemaking authority
centered on five basic points. First, the Senate contended that
Congress's historical delegation of rulemaking authority to the
Supreme Court did not lessen its own rulemaking authority,
and furthermore, that the Supreme Court cases construing
rulemaking authority have affirmed congressional power to
regulate practice and procedure in the federal courts. Second,
the Senate argued that only the Constitution, and not the Rules
Enabling Act, limited congressional power to enact procedural
rules. Third, the Senate offered numerous examples of when
Congress has exercised rulemaking power, and, fourth, argued
that the Rules Enabling Act barred the Supreme Court from
proposing the Civil Justice Reform Act. Fifth, the Senate contended that its spending powers justified the legislation. As
194.

S. REP. No. 416, supra note 3, at 9, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at

6811.
195. In a subsequent law review commentary, the staff director for the
Senate Judiciary Committee also characterized the objectives as "cloaked in
separation of powers terms." Peck, supra note 27, at 114.
196. This discussion is based on the Senate Report, supra note 3, with occasional parallel citations to the same or similar assertions in the staff memorandum and the staff director's commentary.
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this Article suggests, the Senate's position consisted of an odd
melange of debating points that stood the Rules Enabling Act
on its head and changed this statute from an "Rules Enabling
Act" to a "Rules Disabling Act."
1.

Historical Delegation of Rulemaking Power to the Judicial
Branch

Although the Senate acknowledged that Congress has "delegated some rulemaking authority to the courts," it also steadfastly maintained that this delegation did "not lessen the
rulemaking power conferred on Congress by the Constitution."1 97 The Senate cited as support for this proposition two
Supreme Court cases, Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. 198 and Hannah
v. Plumer, 99 and a quotation from a federal district court
20 0
judge.
The Senate's sources are unconvincing on the rulemaking
allocation issue. The excerpted sources merely state that while
Congress has the power to regulate federal practice and proce201
dure, it can exercise that power by delegating it to the courts.
The delegation point is a rhetorical red herring because it says
nothing about the allocation of rulemaking authority with reference to exercise of the delegation, particularly with reference
to rule content. It is true that Congress may delegate rulemaking power without lessening its ability to exercise some
rulemaking authority. That Congress may delegate its
rulemaking power, however, does not lessen the ability of the
federal judiciary to exercise its own statutorily assigned
rulemaking authority delineated in the Rules Enabling Act.
Delegation power really reveals nothing, unless one construes it to mean that whatever Congress can delegate it can
deny altogether. If this is so, then Congress must repeal its
own Rules Enabling Act, which statutorily sets forth the rela197. S.

REP.

No. 416, supra note 3,at 9, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at

6812.

198. Id. (citing Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941)).
199. Id. (citing Hannah v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460 (1964)).
200. Id. at 10, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6812 (citing JACK B. WEINsTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 90 (1977)). Although

the Senate Report states that "[t]he Supreme Court's consistent and longstanding recognition of congressional rulemaking authority has produced
broad agreement on this point among leading scholars in the field," the Senate
report cites no other scholar for this proposition other than Judge Jack Weinstein. See id.
201. See S. REP. No. 416, supra note 3, at 9-10, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6812 (quotations from Sibbach and Hannah).
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tive spheres of rulemaking authority between Congress and the
federal courts. The Senate's argument is flawed because it establishes a principle of rulemaking allocation without reference
to rulemakdng content. Thus, the Senate's position fails to recognize that the Rules Enabling Act has clearly assigned substantive rulemaking power to Congress and procedural
rulemaking power to the federal courts. In essence, then, the
Rules Enabling Act governs and limits congressional rulemaking power.
Further, that federal courts have for more than fifty years
recognized joint rulemaking authority and Congress's delegation power, says nothing about Congress's superior rulemaking
authority absent any reference to rule content. Without an outright repeal of the Rules Enabling Act, the delegation power of
Congress certainly does not support its claim to exclusive
rulemaking authority.
Finally, the Senate's reliance on a 1926 report 2° 2 concerning the then-proposed Rules Enabling Act undercuts, rather
than supports, its position. The earlier report states:
[T]he bill proposed [the Rules Enabling Act] will not deprive
Congress of the power, if an occasion should arise, to regulate court
practice, for it is not predicated upon the theory that the courts have
inherent power to make rules of practice beyond the power of Congress to amend or repeal. * * * It gives to the court the power to initiate a reformed [f]ederal procedure without the surrender of the
legislative
power to correct an unsatisfactory exercise of that
20 3
power.

The 1926 Rules Enabling Act report suggests that the Act's
drafters did not expect Congress to relinquish its "constitutional" role. The report, however, also specifies what that role
was: exercising a legislative veto over the judicial branch's proposed rule reforms.20 4 The report states that federal procedural
202. Id. at 9-10, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6812 (citing S. REP. No.
1174, 69th Cong., 2d [sic] Sess. 7 (1926)).
203. Id (quoting S. REP. No. 1174, 69th Cong., 2d [sic] Sess. 7 (1926)). See
infra note 204 for correct citation.
204. See id. (quoting S. REP. No. 1174, 69th Cong., 2d [sic] Sess. 7 (1926) to
support the argument that Congress retained the power to "amend," "repeal,"
or "correct" the judiciary's reforms). The Senate Report for the Civil Justice
Reform Act omitted important language from the 1926 report. This Report
states that Congress retained the power to "revise rules proposed by the
Supreme Court, or by legislation... modify or entirely withdraw the delegatioa of power to that body." See S. REP. No. 1174, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 7
(1926). The 1926 report continues on to explain:
But it is proper in this connection to say that where the entire
responsibility for formulating rules of procedure has been delegated
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reform, under the Rules Enabling Act, was to "initiate" in the
judicial branch. The Senate's 1990 interpretation of its
rulemaking authority, as well as its reading of the 1926 legislawith the
tive history of the Rules Enabling Act, is inconsistent
20 5
actual 1926 version of rulemaking allocation.
2. The Rules Enabling Act and Congressional Authority to
Promulgate Rules
The Senate's next argument in support of its assertion 2of
06
exclusive rulemaking authority consisted of three statements
together forming an unconvincing, if not illogical, syllogism.
First, the Senate stated that the Supreme Court's authority to
enact rules of procedure was far more limited than that of Congress because the Court only has the authority delegated to it
in the Rules Enabling Act. Second, the Senate stated that the
Court had the power to propose only procedural rules-i.e.,
those with no substantive effect.20 7 Third, the Senate stated

that congressional authority to prescribe procedural rules was
limited only by the Constitution, and not by the Rules Enabling
proceAct. The Senate concluded that Congress could 20enact
8
dural rules to advance its substantive policy goals.
The Senate stated these contentions in two passages in the
legislative history of the Civil Justice Reform Act. The Senate
relied on a House report that accompanied the 1988 congressional revisions to the Rules Enabling Act to describe the scope
of its exclusive rulemaking authority: "[the Rules Enabling
Act] is intended to allocate to Congress, as opposed to the
Supreme Court exercising delegated legislative power, lawmaking choices that necessarily and obviously requireconsideration
to the courts, the tendency has been to allow such rules to stand without amendment by legislative bodies. The reason for this is that it is
convenient for the legislature to refer proposed changes to the courts
because they are found to be better equipped to consider them.
Id. The Report than provides a historical context for this "tendency," citing
experiences in several states and England. See id.
205. See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982) (providing extensive legislative history of Rules
Enabling Act).
206. See S. REP. No. 416, supra note 3, at 10, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6813.
207. Non-procedural rules run afoul of the Rules Enabling Act by
"abridg[ing], enlarg[ing,] or modify[ing] substantive right[s]." Id. (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 2072).
208. Id. (noting that "[s]uch rules define the area of court rulemaking that
is allowed to Congress, but prohibited to the Supreme Court.").
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of policies extrinsic to the business of the courts."20 9 Further,
the Senate stated that "[ijmportantly, the report also refers to
Congress['s] exclusive power to enact procedural rules that 'affect its constituencies in their out-of-court affairs.' "210
These two crucial passages in the Civil Justice Reform
Act's legislative history completely redefined the rulemaking
allocation between the two branches. Prior to the Act, the crucial conceptual distinction relating to the allocation of rulemaking authority was between substantive and procedural
matters. 21 1 However difficult this distinction has proven in theory and application, it nonetheless has been the conceptual paradigm for defining each branch's rulemaking authority. 21 2
The Senate's legislative history to the Civil Justice Reform
Act articulated new glosses on the Rules Enabling Act that empowered Congress to promulgate procedural rules in new situations. This novel interpretation allows Congress to enact
procedural rules where any rulemaking choice "requires consideration of policies extrinsic to the business of the courts" or
"affect[s] its constituencies in their out-of-court affairs.2 1 3
These formulations are different and more expansive than the
existing substance/procedure distinction and obviate any notion
of a purely procedural rule. Stated differently, it is difficult to
think of a purely housekeeping procedural rule that could not
be construed to require consideration of some policy extrinsic
to the business of the courts or that may not affect some Congressperson's constituency in out-of-court affairs. With these
two operative definitions, then all rulemaking is within the
Congress's province (which is exactly the Senate's point). By
definitional fiat, the Senate has thus arrogated to Congress all
procedural rulemaking authority.
209. Id. at 10-11, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6813 (citing H.R. REP.
No. 422, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1985) (emphasis added)).
210. Id. (citing H. R. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1985)) (emphasis added).
211. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 386-87 (1989); Hannah
v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
212. See supra notes 198-99.
213. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361. See generally Paul D. Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure"in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DuKE L.J. 281 (examining the meanings of "substance" and "procedure" in evaluating the effect
of the supercession clause of the Rules Enabling Act); Stephen B. Burbank,
Hold the Corks: A Comment on Paul Carrington's "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1012 (1989) (response to Professor Carrington).
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Past Congressional Exercises of Rulemaking Authority

The third argument the Senate advanced to support its
contention that Congress has exclusive rulemaking authority
relies on circular logic: the Senate contended that Congress
must have that power because it had on previous occasions exercised that power. Each example of the use of such authority,
such as the Speedy Trial Act,214 the Federal Rules of Evidence,
and the multi-district litigation statute,215 however, is problematic and hardly supports the Senate's categorical claim to exclusive procedural rulemaking authority.
The Speedy Trial Act is arguably the Senate's best example
of the plenary exercise of congressional "procedural" rulemaking authority. 216 Nonetheless, the Speedy Trial Act is not a
compelling example because that Act's intrasion into the federal courts' internal affairs is minimal compared to those the
Civil Justice Reform Act requires. 21 7 The Speedy Trial Act
concerned only the timing of criminal cases and did not mandate that prosecutors, defense lawyers, victims, and criminals,
the system's "users," effect complete reform of the federal
criminal procedure system. Moreover, the Speedy Trial Act,
which deprives federal courts of jurisdiction over criminal cases
that are not prosecuted after a certain length of time, is essen21 8
tially jurisdictional in nature.
In addition, as the Senate itself concedes, Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 50(b), proposed by the Supreme Court, preceded the Speedy Trial Act. Congress's dissatisfaction with the
Supreme Court's rule prompted Congress to enact its own version, 219 an exercise of power that is within the scope of Con214. S. REP. No. 416, supra note 3, at 11, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6813 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3152).
215. Id., reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6814 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1407).
The original Senate staff memorandum in support of the constitutionality of
the Civil Justice Reform Act did not refer to the multidistrict litigation statute; it only cited the Speedy Trial Act and the Federal Rules of Evidence. See
supra note 149 and accompanying text (Memorandum to Sen. Joseph R.
Biden).
216. The Senate would have a better example of the exercise of independent congressional rulemaking authority in the 1983 enactment of the revised
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. See Mullenix, supra note 8, at 844-46.
217. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (1988) (providing that criminal defendant must be brought to trial within seventy days from the filing of an information or indictment, or from the date defendant has appeared before a judicial
officer of the court in which the charge is pending).
218. See supra note 114.
219. Seeking to press the analogy to the Civil Justice Reform Act even further, the Senate legislative history suggests that Congress enacted its own ver-
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gress's authority to "amend," "repeal," or "correct" a preexisting Court-proposed rule.220 The Speedy Trial Act illustrates the exercise of a congressional legislative veto over a
Court-proposed rule revision; it does not illustrate congressionally-initiated wholesale reform of an entire procedural system.
The enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, falling as
it does somewhere in the "twilight area" between substance
and procedure, is an even more problematic illustration of Congress's alleged exclusive rulemaking authority.221 Significantly,
between the legislative hearings on the Civil Justice Reform
Act and the final Senate report, the Judiciary Committee's arguments based on enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence
disappeared from the official legislative record. Perhaps this is
in no small part because the Senate staff memorandum quotes
Justice Douglas dissenting from the Supreme Court's proposed
Rules of Evidence regarding the relative allocation of rulemaking authority:
I can find no legislative history that rules of evidence were to be
included in 'practice and procedure' as used in [the Rules Enabling
Act] ....
The words 'practice and procedure' in the setting of the Act
seem to me to exclude rules of evidence. They seem to me to be
words of art that describe pretrial procedures, pleadings,
and proce2 22
dures for preserving objections and taking appeals.

Justice Douglas suggests in his dissent that evidentiary
rules relate more to the substantive elements of a claim than to
pure procedure. Although his statement takes the rules of evidence outside the purview of judicial promulgation, it quite precisely makes the definitional case that procedural rulemaking
belongs within the scope of judicial authority. Since the Civil
Justice Reform Act is almost exclusively concerned with pretrial procedures, Justice Douglas's statement undercuts the
sion of the Speedy Trial Act because implementation of the Act might have
required additional court resources in the form of new judges, clerks, and computers. See S. REP. No. 416, supra note 3, at 11, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6814 (citing to H.R. REP. No. 1508, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974)).
220. See supra note 204. Similarly, when Congress was dissatisfied with
the Civil Rules Advisory Committee's 1983 proposed amendment of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 4, relating to service of process, it substituted its own
version. This unprecedented, unilateral congressional amendment of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure subsequently turned out to be a poor revision, necessitating further remedial amendment by the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules. See Mullenix, supra note 8, at 845.
221. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 386 (1989).
222. Senate Hearings, supra note 90, at 67 (quoting Letter from Justice
Douglas dissenting from the Supreme Court's proposed Rules of Evidence (October Term 1972)).
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very position the Senate advances in support of Congress's exclusive rulemaking authority.
Finally, the multi-district litigation statute is an equally dubious illustration of exclusive congressional rulemaking authority. The multi-district litigation statute is a federal transfer
provision, concerned with venue and consolidation. Although it
is not technically a jurisdictional provision, the multi-district
litigation statute is jurisdiction-like in that it confers temporary
jurisdiction on a federal forum to conduct consolidated pretrial
proceedings in specially-designated multidistrict litigation
cases. 223 Even the federal judges appearing on behalf of the Judicial Conference conceded that Congress has exclusive authority to enact jurisdictional legislation. 224 In addition, like the
Speedy Trial Act, the multi-district litigation statute did not effect an entire wholesale revision of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
4.

The Rules Enabling Act, the Supreme Court, and the Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990

The Senate's fourth argument for its superior rulemaking
authority was that the Rules Enabling Act, in addition to affirmnatively requiring Congress to enact the Civil Justice Reform Act, barred the Supreme Court from proposing such
legislation. 225 The Senate, in support of this position, relied on
two of its own definitions of the scope of congressional
rulemaking authority: initiatives that affect "constituencies in
their out-of-court affairs" and those that involve "policies ex'226
trinsic to the business of the courts.
The Senate then characterized the Civil Justice Reform
Act as having the "substantive goals" of increasing access to the
223. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988).
224. See House Hearing, supra note 94, at 105-06. Indeed, the proposed
Multi-Party, Multiforum Jurisdiction Acts of 1989, 1990 and 1991 all were proposed revisions of the multidistrict litigation act. One of the specific purposes
of the proposed new Multi-Party, Multiforum statutes was to correct the jurisdictional deficiencies inherent in the existing multi-district litigation statute,
in order to supply a minimal diversity concept to transfers. See supra note
189.
225. The legislative history states this proposition by way of conclusion:
"The Civil Justice Reform Act is within the exclusive rulemaking authority of
Congress. Indeed, the limitations of the Rules Enabling Act would bar the
Supreme Court from proposing this legislation." S. REP. No. 416, supra note 3,
at 11, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6814.
226. See supra notes 209-10.
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federal courts 22 7 and improving the efficiency and competitiveness of American business. 228 These substantive goals, according to the Senate, affect constituencies in their out-of-court
affairs and involve policies extrinsic to the business of the
courts. Hammering home its final nail, the Senate's legislative
history declared: "A proposal intended to increase access to the
courts and to improve the productivity and competitiveness of
American business cannot fairly be described as purely
'229
procedural.
This argument is conclusory, circular, and illogical.
Whatever may be the "substantive" goals of any congressional
legislation, these goals say little about whether the content of
the legislation is substantive or procedural. The Senate asserted a power to enact the Civil Justice Reform Act by simply
formulating an entirely new and expansive definition of "substantive" matters and then miraculously transformed matters
that previously were understood as purely procedural into substantive matters and goals. 230 One must concede the Senate's
recasting of the substance/procedure distinction in order to
conclude that the Rules Enabling Act affirmatively prohibits
the Supreme Court from enacting like legislation.
The Senate's reasoning represents a peculiar inversion of
the long-standing interpretation of the Rules Enabling Act 23 1
227. A controversial aspect of the Civil Justice Reform Act is whether it
will actually increase access to the federal courts, as the legislative history asserts, or whether it will impede the access for certain litigants and types of
cases. Certainly, with a strong emphasis on implementation of case tracking
systems and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, see supra notes 10-12,
the Civil Justice Reform Act is arguably intended to shunt certain cases and
litigants out of federal courts.
228. See S. REP. No. 416, supra note 3, at 12, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6814. This portion of the legislative history is also subject to challenge and
debate on empirical grounds. See supra notes 129-31.
229. S. REP. No. 416, supra note 3, at 12 reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6815.
230. The Senate Report adds that the standards governing legislative initiatives like the Civil Justice Reform Act require "the accountability and give
and take of the legislative process." See id. (citing Mary K. Kane, The Golden
Wedding Year: Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins and the Federal Rules,
63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 671, 691 (1988) (recommending "legislative solutions"
when "political interests demand intervention")). It is a thesis of this Article
that the politicization of the federal procedural rulemaking process is highly
undesirable and is contrary to the longstanding ethos of the federal rules. See
Mullenix, supra note 8, at 855-57.
231. See, e.g., Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 10 (1941) (stating that the
Rules Enabling Act "was purposely restricted in its operation to matters of
pleading and court practice and procedure"); Hannah v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,
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and its allocation of rulemaking authority between the two
branches. The Senate's analysis changes the statute from one
that, by congressional delegation, enables the judiciary to promulgate federal rules of practice and procedure into an Act
that disables the federal courts from performing this function.
Congress, by obliterating any meaningful distinction between
substance and procedure in the Civil Justice Reform Act's legislative history, usurps procedural rulemaking authority.
5. The Funding Theory of Congressional Authority
The Senate based its final claim to exclusive authority to
enact the Civil Justice Reform Act on in its authority to fund
the measure. The Senate stated that this authority "is found in
the bill's authorization of funding to accomplish its purposes," 232 and argued that its authorization of $25 million dollars to provide resources to early implementation districts
"necessarily require[s] considerations uniquely within the province of Congress." 233
This is a bootstrap argument. That Congress may, through
a bill, authorize funding to accomplish its purposes cannot also
be used as the basis of its authority to enact the legislation.
Stated differently, Congress cannot legitimize every assertion
of legislative power through a funding provision. Congressional
power to authorize funds to carry out properly enacted statutes
says nothing about its power to enact that legislation in the
first place, or about constitutional and statutory allocation of
rulemaking authority. Although Congress can condition the
spending of funds authorized for a lawful purpose, it cannot imply the lawfulness of an authorization from the fact of its
existence.
B.

THE SENATE VERSION OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS

DOCTRINE AND RULEMAKING AUTHORITY

Significantly, the entire legislative history of the Civil Justice Reform Act says nothing about the separation of powers
doctrine. The Senate only referred to the doctrine in passing
471 (1965) (stating that the Rules Enabling Act generally directs federal courts
to apply state "substantive" law and federal "procedural" law).
232. See S. REP. No. 416, supra note 3, at 12 reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6815 (characterizing this as "[a]nother clear indication that the Civil Justice
Reform Act is within the exclusive rulemaking authority of Congress.. ").
233. Id. The Senate advanced a similar funding argument in support of
congressional authority to enact the Speedy Trial Act. See supra note 149 and
accompanying text (Memorandum to Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.).
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when it briefly mentioned that any Rules Enabling Act challenges to the Civil Justice Reform Act were "most often
cloaked in separation of powers terms" and were without
merit. 234 Further, the Senate report, even though it counters
the Rules Enabling Act theory with two Supreme Court citations,2 35 fails to address the separation of powers argument that
the American Bar Association presented in the last legislative
hearing. 236 Thus, while the Senate's Rules Enabling Act analysis is paltry, its separation of powers discussion is non237
existent.
The Senate's dereliction is interesting for at least three
reasons. First, it suggests the inability of the Senate to distinguish the Rules Enabling Act question, as a matter of statutory
allocation and delegation, from the more fundamental question
of a constitutional separation of the legislative and judicial
branches.
Second, the Senate Report's characterization of the separation of powers doctrine as a "cloaked" argument is a transparent rebuke of the Judicial Conference, the chief institutional
group that opposed the legislation and repeatedly raised the argument. The Senate's blatant reproach of the judiciary, its
heavy-handed usurpation of procedural rulemaking authority,
and its dismissive attitude toward a fundamental constitutional
question, embody the very tension that the principles of constitutional separation of powers seek to resolve.
Third, the failure of the Senate to address the separation of
powers problem suggests either an act of omission or commission. On the one hand, the failure to analyze the separation of
powers problem could be interpreted as ignorance or disregard.
Stated somewhat differently, perhaps the Senate just did not
get it. On the other hand, a more disturbing possibility is that
the Senate did get it, but did not like the consequences for procedural rulemaking and speedy civil justice reform.
234.

See S. REP. No. 416, supra note 3, at 9, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.

at 6811.
235. See supra notes 198-200.
236. See supra notes 181-85 and accompanying text.
237. This Article's companion piece discusses whether the separation of
powers argument has any independent legal merit apart from the statutory
Rules Enabling Act problem. Whatever the weight of that theory, the separation of powers problem is nonetheless present in the basic question of whether
Congress has the ability to enact the Civil Justice Reform Act. The official
legislative history tells us that the Senate simply chose to ignore and dismiss
this issue. See Mullenix, supra note 24.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

C.

[Vol. 77:375

THE SENATE'S PUBLIC POLICY ARGUMENT

The Senate Judiciary Committee, in acknowledging objections to "the congressional involvement in procedural reform
that the bill represents,"' sa indicated that its legislative initiative in the Civil Justice Reform Act was not inconsistent with
the Rules Enabling Act, either as a matter of constitutional law
or as a matter of policy.239 Thus, as a coda to its constitutional
discussion, the legislative history to the Act also set forth a pol240
icy basis for assertion of congressional rulemaking authority.
The Senate defensively rebutted any claim that "courts are
exclusively suited to propose initiatives such as the Civil Justice
Reform Act." The Senate based its policy argument instead on
the proposition that users of the federal court system ought to
have a say in the procedural rules that govern the system. Because "users" currently do not have a say in the rulemaking
process, 2 41 it was the task of their democratically-elected representatives to give them that voice. The Senate reasoned that
user-based rule reform could only be accomplished through legislation that re-delegates rulemaking authority to the users of
the court, rather than to the judges. 24
A second policy argument, somewhat related to the first,
was that in amending the Rules Enabling Act in 1988, Congress
intended to expand the opportunity for public comment on proposed rules. 243 The current process, the Senate suggested, did
"not fully allow for the extent of user involvement that has led
to the Civil Justice Reform Act or that is contemplated for the
advisory groups."' 2 " This invocation of the recent amendment
238.
6811.

S. REP. No. 416, supra note 3, at 9, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at

239. Id.
240. Id. at 12-13, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6815-16. This section of
the Senate Report is entitled "Strong policy reasons also argue in favor of the
legislation." Id. at 12, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6815.
241. Or so the Senate asserts, but see 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-2074 (1988 & Supp.
II 1990) (providing for enhanced public participation in the rulemaking
process).

242. Senator Biden is quoted as stating that:
The users of the federal court system have no means other than
through their democratically-elected representatives to express their
dissatisfaction with the civil justice system and to demand reform of
that system. For too long, we have ignored these cries for change, and
this bill finally - and properly, in my view - acts upon their desires.
S. REP. No. 416, supra note 3, at 12, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N at 6815
(quoting June 26, 1990, Hearing Transcript, at 8)).

243. Id. at 12-13, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6815.
244. Id. at 13, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6815. In support of the
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to the Rules Enabling Act rings hollow as far as demonstrating
a policy of encouraging enhanced participation. Congress, for a
legislative body so intent on reaching out to the citizenry to
promulgate rules of civil procedure, was ironically quite exclusionary in the drafting process and the legislative hearings on
the Civil Justice Reform Act.24 5 The Senate Judiciary subcommittee's own actions in promulgating this legislation suggest
that the Senate seemed to favor participatory democracy more
as a matter of convenience than principle.
The Senate's last policy argument was that Congress determined that there was a crisis in the federal courts characterized
by excessive litigation costs and delay. Thus, there was a compelling need to address this situation, which involves basic policy issues. Legislation, the Senate concluded, was the
appropriate means to address these problems and "the appro'246
priate source of the policies is Congress, not the courts.
In essence, the Senate's policy arguments may be reduced
to two simple propositions, although perhaps the Senate would
not state them so baldly: first, litigants are constituents, and
second, procedural rulemaking is a substantive policy issue.
Despite all the democratic rhetoric, these policy arguments represent good old-fashioned constituent politics, except that Congress has discovered a new interest group: people who are
proposition that the Rules Enabling Act should involve more extensive public
participation, the Senate Report cites Professor Carrington, the current reporter for the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules: "The Rules Enabling Act
was avowedly anti-democratic in the sense that it withdrew 'procedural' lawmaking from the political arena and made it the activity of professional technicians." id., reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6815-16 (citing Carrington, supra
note 213, at 310).
The Senate Report quotes Professor Carrington out of context and distorts his beliefs regarding the extent and desirability of public participation in
the rulemaking process. First, Professor Carrington is describing the original
version of the Rules Enabling Act and the philosophy of expertise that
animated allocation of procedural rulemaking to the judicial branch. His statement has no bearing on the 1988 revision of the Rules Enabling Act, which
provided for expanded public comment opportunities, and which Professor
Carrington endorsed. See generally, Paul D. Carrington, The New Order in
JudicialRulemaking, 75 JUDICATURE 161 (1991) (discussing 1988 amendment
to the Rules Enabling Act and the requirement of enhanced public participation in the rulemaking process). Second, although Professor Carrington supports expanded participation in rulemaking, I do not believe he advocates
abandonment of the traditional role of the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules. See id.
245. See supra notes 94-95, 136-38 and accompanying text.
246. S.REP. No. 416, supra note 3, at 13, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6816.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:375

sued, and sued often. 247

CONCLUSION
It is difficult to assess what is more disturbing about the
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990: the Act's requirement that
each federal district court institute civil justice reform, or the
process by which Congress enacted the legislation. The Act's
legislative history consists of exclusion, distortion, omission,
and disregard. Moreover, it is significant who Congress did or
did not hear when it drafted this legislation: Congress's central
preoccupation with protecting the special interests of business
and insurance concerns supplied the bill's rationale that litigation costs impair the ability of American corporations to compete at home and abroad.
The Civil Justice Reform Act's central concept is that the
system's "users" should be responsible for procedural rulemaking, but the Act itself was promulgated without any meaningful
consultative review by the major users of the system. That federal judges were excluded from the Brookings-Biden task force
and not consulted in promulgating this legislation is astonishing: apparently the Senate's definition of the system's users
does not include the federal judges who sit and hear cases.
Throughout the drafting and hearing process, the Senate excluded significant constituent voices and sponsored a systemic
procedural reform that will effectively exclude certain types of
litigants and cases.
Further, although the legislative history pays passing lip
service to the proposition that cost and delay also impair the access of "middle class Americans" to the federal courts, it makes
no reference to other affected strata of American society.
These other users include poor people, discrimination victims,
consumers, environmental and social activists, as well as tort
victims who may have legitimate legal problems worthy of redress-in short, the people who are "clogging" the courts by
247. In particular, Congress, in the Civil Justice Reform Act, seems to be
more interested in certain kinds of people who sue: to wit, big businesses, insurance concerns, and the like. These constituencies explain the legislative

finding that the civil justice system impairs the ability of American businesses
to compete in the world marketplace. See Hensler, supra note 28 (commenting on the political agenda underlying the civil justice reform movement).
These constituencies also explain, to an extent, the composition of the Brookings-Biden Task Force and the witness roster for the legislative hearings on
the Civil Justice Reform Act. See supra notes 94-95.
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seeking to enforce substantive rights that business and insurance interests cannot repeal through substantive legislation.
Ultimately, what is so disturbing about the Civil Justice
Reform Act is the blatant as well as disguised political agendas
behind the legislation. The blatant agenda is to improve American business competitiveness domestically and abroad; the disguised political agenda is to remove disagreeable cases and
disagreeable litigants from the federal courts. The blatant
agenda is to allow local groups to create innovative procedural
rules to enhance litigation efficiency; the disguised agenda is to
foster certain kinds of procedural rules that will favor certain
types of litigants. The blatant agenda is to "democratically"
give procedural rulemaking authority to users of the system;
the disguised agenda is to strip the judicial branch of its traditional rulemaking functions and transfer that function to
unelected elite advisory groups dominated by business interests
and corporate and insurance civil defense attorneys.
The witness who testified before the Senate judiciary committee that the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 was the legislative sleeper of the year was quite correct. The Act is the
keystone measure in the late twentieth-century counter-revolution in procedural justice, a movement that is destined to strip
away the procedural reforms accomplished through the 1938
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The transsubstantive philosophy of simplicity, uniformity, flexibility, and deliberative
rulemaking that animated those rules not only has been rejected, but will be replaced with one of complexity, multiplicity,
rigidity, and politicization. Procedural rules will be shaped to
favor those groups with the most effective lobbyists in Congress
or the local advisory groups.
Federal procedural rulemaking has for the past fifty years
been counter-majoritarian and predicated on a model of expertise. But no one, to date, has persuasively argued why procedural rulemaking should be otherwise. The legislative history
of the Civil Justice Reform Act invokes the rhetorical language
of democratic ideology in place of reasoned argument for allocating procedural rulemaking to local amateur groups, but
there are good empirical reasons for not wanting Congress to
promulgate federal rules of civil procedure. 248 As this Article
points out, there are also equally compelling reasons for not
wanting local amateur groups to do so either.
248.

See Mullenix, supra note 8, at 843-55.
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In a sense, the recent politicization of the rulemaking process has inspired a kind of parity debate as to relative legislative competencies of the branches of federal government to
promulgate procedural rules. Congress's version of democracy,
although speciously attractive, in the end will prove to be antidemocratic. A Congress that defines civil justice reform in
terms of cost and delay, but leaves out justice, is surely suspect
on the subject of democratic rulemaking.
Finally, the public and the legal community should keep in
mind that Congress, in asserting an exclusive right over the
rulemaking function, has declared all procedural rules to have
substantive effect. All rules are, therefore, now legitimately
within the ambit of congressional authority. Congress has,
through the Civil Justice Reform Act, abolished the twilight
area that existed between substance and procedure, and has
perhaps ended civil procedure as we have known it for the past
fifty years.

